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ABSTRACT
This study examines problems which the US faces in its
support of efforts by other governments to defeat revolu-
tionary insurgents. The US has in the past been drawn into
supporting conflicts for a protracted period without receiv-
ing apparent benefit nor approaching a favorable end to the
conflict. This thesis addresses why the US encounters
problems in its support of counterinsurgency efforts and why
it has difficulty in effectively terminating this type of
low-intensity conflict (LIC). This study assumes that the
best outcome to achieve US long-term goals in most cases of
revolutionary insurgency is a negotiated settlement. The
study develops a list of factors considered necessary to
produce a negotiated settlement of an insurgency. It then
examines the various counterinsurgency strategies used in El
Salvador, analyzing their effects on the factors needed to
achieve a settlement. The US has improved its approach to
counterinsurgency. However, there are problems within US
military and political organizations which inhibit the US'
ability to achieve effective termination of an insurgency.
These include the lack of consistent pressure on the host
government and militazy to reform and to compromi3e on
settlement conditions and the desire within the US
administzation to achieve a military victory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study will examine methods of conflict termination
in the case of a type of low-intensity conflict (LIC) in
which a major power, such as the United States, is
supporting a foreign government's counterinsurgency against
a guerrilla movement with revolutionary goals.
Historically, in supporting the counterinsurgency
efforts of other countries, US policymakers have often
allowed military operations to reach a magnitude and
duration way beyond the initial intentions of both military
and political leaders, the costs apparently exceeding the
objectives. The long-term objectives involved in US support
for counterinsurgency conflicts are often unclear.
Acceptable, realistic conditions for conflict termination
are disputed.
Because a revolutionary insurgency is fundamentally a
political problem, successful conflict termination of most
advanced revolutionary insurgencies requires a negotiated
political agreement as well as the use of military force.
Achieving the termination of this type of insurgency differs
from that of other types of conflict in that the insurgent
faction is relying on the extended length of the conflict to
eventually achieve its objectives: it is willing to
sacrifice terrain and space in order to buy time. The
insurgents in a protracted guerrilla struggle are not trying
to win militarily as much as to survive, to not lose, in the
hope that over time the involvement becomes so tedious and
unpopular to the incumbent government's internal as well as
external supporters that they apply pressure to reduce the
negotiating conditions just to be able to end the confli-t.
External supporters may be forced by domestic pressures to
unilaterally curtail their assistance without an agreement
being reached.
The United States, as a major power and external
supporter on whom the host government is generally highly
dependent for survival, has a great deal of influence on the
timing and conditions of the negotiating process. In past
protracted counterinsurgency struggles, by a certain point
the United States has invested so much in the conflict that
policymakers tend to feel that the minimum objectives
satisfied must be highly advantageous to the US in order to
justify the expense thus far (especially if US troops have
een involved in the conflict). However, these stated
settlement conditions are often so stringent and
uncompromising that the insurgents are unwilling to enter
into negotiations as long as they have the resources and
will to continue the struggle.
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As the conflict drags on, US domestic and international
support often erodes (if it ever existed) and may apply
increasing pressure on policymakers to conclude the conflict
as soon as possible regardless of the terms. Due to failure
to bring about earlier termination, the US may be forced to
conclude its support efrrt under highly unfavorable
conditions. The liss of domestic backing for continuing its
support effort can be perceived by the insurgents, who use
this knowledge to their benefit at the bargaining table,
realizing that the US is experiencing great pre-gure to
curtail its military support.
The feasibility and effectiveness of using military
force as a US foreign policy option in certain situations is
lowered by a national fear of the difficulty of ending US
involvement iD a low-intensity conflict (LIC), partly aue to
the legacy of US involvement in the Vietnam conflict. The
US has particular aifficulty in controlling and succe. fully
terminating its support of the counterinsurgency efforts of
foreign governments. This has contributed to a lack of
consensus Fmong military and political officials, Congress,
and the public on the issue of whether ..o support such
opeia'Ions and the scope, character, and length of the
involvement, as well as the amount of controL -he US should
ho~d over host government Actions. The lack of consensus
anc. rnzecurity due to problems with past involvements has
3
contributed to a policy paralysis when the US is faced with
issues related to such support efforts, even while already
deeply involved in suppcrting a counterinsurgency effort.
A current example of t:-Js Fhenomtnon can be seen in the
case of US involvement in the insurgency in El Salvador.
Delays in appyoval for requested funding, contradictory
guidelines, and a piecemeal approach to assistan.ce have
reduced the effectiveness of the US support effort.
There are many types of internal war, varying in their
goals and scope and the level of internal and externa±
support. rhis study concentrates on US responseL to the
political-ideological type of insurgency known as a
revolutionary struggle: this is a long-term strategy which
gradually or7'nizes a mass base of political support with
t'e goal of changing political values and structures end
transforminq the economic and 3ocial order, to accomplish
over time a revolution. Among other tactics, this strategy
may involve the use of guerrilla warfare and other
"unconventional" methods of anti-government violence and
often becomes a prctracted conflict.
In cases where the host government is highly dependent
on US support for survival, the US has tended to support the
host government with a level of military and eccnomic
assistance sufficient enough to defend itself and remain in
power, Lo perpetuate3 the conflict. However, the US has not
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provided enough in terms of level of support at one time or
enough appropriate assistance, to actually defeat the
insurgents militarily or to resolve the conditions which
prompted the insurgency and allowed it to become so imbedded
politically. The types of US assistance provided are often
inappropriate for actually bringing about successful long-
term termination of the insurgent conflict. Some tactics
and weapons are more appropriate to certain phases of the
insurgency than to others, more effective in countering
certain insurgent strategies than others. US policymakers
should also ensure that they take advantage of the influence
from dependence by the host country's government and
military on US support to pressure them to reform.
The main concern of this study is with how the US can
achieve a negotiated settlement to successfully terminate
its involvement in an insurgent conflict as quickly as
possible while still fulfilling many of its political
objectives, or if such a settlement cannot be reached, when
and how the US should initiate its unilateral withdrawal.
Chapter One addresses the different types of
insurgencies and insurgent strategies. Chapter Two looks at
why the US supports counterinsurgency efforts. It attempts
to explain why the US experiences such extensive problems in
controllinq and terminating its counterinsurgency support
efforts. The second chapter also examines some aspects of
5
American culture, ideology and history as well as inadequate
strategic planning which apparently contribute to problems
in trying to accomplish favorable, prompt termination of the
insurgency. It addresses ways in which US support may
contribute to or interfere with the prospects for
termination of this type of LIC.
Chapter Three discusses the possible outcomes of an
insurgency. It applies negotiation theory to the problem of
terminating an insurgency, which, according to a literature
survey conducted by the author, has not been extensively
done previously. This exercise produces in Table 3.1 a list
of conditions apparently necessary to fulfill to achieve a
negotiated settlement to successfully terminate most
revolutionary insurgencies. "Success" is defined as an
outcome which fulfills the majority of US long-term goals,
especially those of stability, democracy, US security, and
reduced dependence on US assistance.
Chapter Four examines strategies which the US can use
in its support of other governments' counterinsurgency
efforts, and how each of the strategies likely affects the
likelihood of achieving successful conflict termination.
'Conflict termination' is defined as more than the cessation
of armed hostilities (a ceasefire) but as a situation where
a mutual political choice is made to achieve less than
maximum objectives on each side, using the minimum necessary
force to achieve an end to hostilities. This study assumes
that counterinsurgency strategy can and should be planned
with attention to its impact on effective termination. The
chapter creates a typology of counterinsurgency strategies,
and examines the instruments used to implement each of the
strateqies. The analysis concludes that a "combined
strategy" is necessary to achieve effective termination of
this type of insurgency at the advanced stage at which the
United States tends to become involved. However, as a look
at the various types of instruments shows, there can be
several different mixes according to the different
priorities guiding a combined strategy.
After analyzing the problems which the United States
has historicp'ly faced in supporting and successfully
terminating a counterinsurgency effort and the strategies
attempted, Chapter Five applies this analysis to the ongoing
insurgency in El Salvador. The United States has supported
the Salvadoran government and military heavily since 1980.
although it has not resorted to direct intervention of US
troops. Chapter Five uses a methodology known as a focused
comparison, applying the same set of factors to several
cases. The case of El Salvador is divided into six sub-
cases by different time periods. The time periods are
chosen by what the author perceived as changing
counterinsurgency strategies by the United States. A
7
background summary outlines the conflict and the main
players. Each sub-section provides a narrative summarizing
the significant events of the period, including the dominant
insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies, military
successes by either side, comparative military and political
progress, and pertinent developments in the external support
countries and other relevant international events. Chapter
Five concludes that while US policymakers have made many
mistakes in their counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador,
the conditions are currently favorable for a negotiated
settlement to occur in the near future. However, since the
economic assistance the United States has provided has been
devoted more to stabilization than to actual development and
reforms, the socio-economic conditions contributing to the
insurgency will remain in place. This may contribute in the
not-too-distant future to a resurfacing of the conflict. In
addition, US support has allowed the regime in the past
decade to avoid making (or even prevented them from making)
the reforms and concessions needed to achieve a negotiated
settlement with results which are successful in the long
term.
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II. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
This chapter examines different types of insurgencies,
including their strategies, goals, phases and tactics,
focusing on a type referred to as "revolutionary
insurgency." It then covers the means, goals, and effects
of external support to each side of an insurgency. After
discussing the reasons for US support of counterinsurgency
efforts, the chapter examines the reasons why the US runs
into problems in its support efforts, constraints on that
support, and why the US is drawn into supporting protracted
conflicts without receiving apparent benefits from its
assistance.
A. TYPES OF INSURGENCY
An insurgency is an organized effort by internal actors
to take control of the state through violent means. There
are several varieties of insurgencies and insurgent
strategies. Insurgencies can be characterized by their
qoals, including secessionist, revolutionary, restorational,
reactionary, and reformist,' as well as by the forms of
warfare the insurgents primarily rely on and their level of
reliance on political organization. Insurgency has been
'O'Neill: 3.
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developed as a response of a generally weaker, non-state
faction to counter the coercive power of the state and its
conventional military tactics. Some insurgents attempt to
use political organization to attempt to compensate for the
material superiority of their opponents.
This study focuses on revolutionary insurgency.
Revolutionary insurgency has been described as ". ..political
warfare that uses armed resistance to overthrow a state and
construct a new society. '2 It is motivated by political-
ideological objectives. A type of revolutionary strategy,
refined by Mao, involves a long-teaim orientation of
gradually organizing a mass base of political support with
the goal of changing political values and structures and
eventually tiansforming the economic and social order. This
strategy tends to involve, at some point, the use of
guerrilla warfare and other "unconventional" methods of
anti-government violence and often becomes a protracted
conflict.
Revolutionary insurgency is generally initiated by an
educated, highly disciplined and political elite. This
leadership often spends considerable time training and
organizing first among themselves, then branching oiit into
forming ranks, long before the outward signs of armed
2Olson: vii.
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conflict appear. Eventually the movement extends its
operations beyond political organization to armed
insurgency. The thrust of their strategy is to deny the
government the support of as many people and groups as
possible, trying to remove the bases of support for the
government and its armed forces.
To accomplish his goal, the revolutionary relies on
grievances such as social, political, and economic
injustice, corruption, foreign domination, and racial or
religious discrimination as the means through which te
government is attacked.
In the simplest type of insurgency, a faction x, the
incumbent government of the state, is in conflict with
faction y, the insurgent in rebellion against the incumbent
government. There may be two or more insurgent groups
actively opposed to the government, combined into a more or
less unified coalition. In the type of insurgency on which
this study is focusing, the armed insurgent faction is
accompanied by a political organization, usually
clandestine. This political arm may be more or less
inclined or able to also participate in legitimate political
processes.
The struggle between the insurgent and the incumbent is
over political legitimacy -- who should govern, and how
they should govern. One of the principal elements in




Because the essential nature of the threat of insurgency is
to political legitimacy, any counterinsurgency strategy
concerned with long-term political stability should include
attention to this issue.
B. INSURGENT STRATEGIES
Types of revolutionary insurgent strategies include
Leninist, Maoist, and the foco (Cuban) method. Instead of
following any pure type, contemporary insurgencies generally
follow a combination of these as well as some indigenous
adaptations to a varying degree. This study concentrates on
insurgent strategies which include many defining
characteristics of the Maoist strategy: great reliance on
popular support, extensive organizational efforts, prolonged
conflict witn a government with superior conflict resources,
and a sequential strategy of stages, beginning with 1)
political organization and terrorism, followed by 2)
guerrilla warfare, and 3) as support increases and the
government weakens, to eventually be succeeded by the
"regularization" of insurgent forces, using mobile-
conventional warfare.
An alternative to the Maoist protracted warfare
strategy, known as foco strategy and used by Castro in his
attempt to overthrow the government in Cuba, holds that
40'Neill: 28.
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insurgent leaders can forego the necessity of creating a
mass-based political movement prior to beginning armed
rebellion, relying instead on small to moderate guerrilla
attacks, limited organization, and a hopefully weak
government. A counterinsurgency strategy relying mostly on
military force is more effective against this type of
insurgency because of its relatively weak political
organization.
C. INSURGENT TACTICS
Insurgent strategies may involve use of a combination
of tactics, including semi-conveintional military operations,
guerrilla wdrfare, and terrorist actions. Guerrilla warfare
is based on the use of mobile tactics by small, lightly
armed groups who aim more to harass their opponents than to
defeat them. Guerrilla warfare differs from terrorism in
that the insurgents' primary targets are usually the
government's security forces and key economic targets, not
unarmed civilians. Guerrilla units are larger than
terrorist cells and tend to require a more elaborate
logistical structure.5 Conventional warfare involves the
direct confrontation of large units in the field.
Unconventional methods used by insurgents include attacks on
small army patrols and outposts for supplies and weapons;
50'Neill: 4.
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disruption of traffic on highways; distribution of
propaganda material; creation of an infrastructure to
challenge the government's control over the countryside; and
urban terrorist tactics such as kidnappings and
assassination.
Insurgents know they risk destruction by confronting
government forces in direct conventicnal engagements, and
thus try to erode the strength and will of their adversary
through the use of terrorism and/or use of guerrilla
warfare. These tactics are intended to increase the cost to
the government and to demonstrate the government's failure
to maintain effective control and provide protection.
D. PHASES OF AN INSURGENCY
An insu..gency may go through several different phases,
and the strategies and tactics the insurgents use may evolve
over time. The various phases and tactics are considered,
according to the revolutionary doctrine, to be increasingly
progressive. However, they may revert to the tactics
associated with a prior phase if it becomes necessary and
they may use a combination of tactics in different regions
simultaneously
Typical phases of a revolutionary conflict have been
outlined in a study of insurgency by several defense
analysts. These phases are not uni-directional nor are they
14
all necessary (some can be skipped) and dividing lines
between phases are not necessarily clear-cut as there may be
a lot of overlap in tactics.
Phases of a Revolutionary Movement: 6
1. Organizational Phase
Organization, Education













Political Mobilization of "Masses"




7. 'Coup de Maitre Phase' (Overthrow of government)
E. GUERRILLA STRATEGY
In a protracted revolutionary conflict, insurgents
using guerrilla warfare methods will trade space and terrain
for time: they are willing to give up territory in order to
buy continued survival for their movement. Insurgents may
6Adapted from Figure in Olson: 24.
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choose a strategy for protracted warfare with the objective
of simply 'not to lose.' The insurgents hope that the
government will grow weary of the struggle and seek to
prevent further losses by either capitulating or negotiating
a settlement favorable to the insurgents. Insurgents are
likely to resist termination of the conflict, seeing no
incentive in seeking peace as long as they believe that they
can get better terms later on through negotiation. This has
been described as "The Power of the Small Belligerent:"
... the side whose war aims in a local war require only
that the enemy not finally defeat it is a formidable
opponent, even to a major power. It is especially
formidable, as the Vietnam war shows, if that major
power's government is for domestic or world political
reasons anxious to limit, wind down, and stop the
fighting. The small-power belligerent, determined to
outwit its major power opponent questing for de-
escalation and peace, may make a peace of reconciliation
almost as iiard to achieve as any other kind of peace.'
Identifying that the government is dependent on a major
power to prosecute the insurgent militarily, the insurgents
may anticipate that as support of the conflict becomes
increasingly unpopular among the public and/or legislature
of the external supporter, the external supporter may face
pressures which demand immediate withdrawal with little




As external actors become involved an insurgency may
take on some aspects of an external war and the problem -f
achieving its termination becomes more complex. Many
analysts insist tha- external involvement usually has the
effect of postponing teLmination instead j. Z bri iging a
prompt, decisive resolution to the conflict.
External actors may choose to support one of the sides
involved in an insurgency, the current govennment or the
insurgents, for several reasons. T .e external support ir y
be formal and open or more discrept and informal. The
importance of external support to the outcome of the
conflict depends on the relative internal strength and unity
of each faction, plus the extent of t- opposing faction's
external support. When a major power supplies a large
amount of assistance to one of the factions, the supported
side becomes kno-,,n as a "proxy" for carrying out that
power's goals.
1. Support to the Insurgents
External support to insurgents is referred to by the
incumbent government and its supporters as subversion.
Subversion can range from allowing exiles and refugees *o
cross the border, providing sanctuary and the ability to
organize, tc giving insurgents low-level financial or
military aid, to supplying more extensive support such as
17
advisors or even troops. Subvercion can be used to weaken
the government of the opposing state in anticipation of
impending external war, out of ideologicai motivations, oz
as a method of trying to secure friendly, cooperative
allies.
8
Nut every insurgency in Latin America since 1959 has
been Marxist-inspired or SovieL-controlled. However, the
Soviet Union, along w: .h Cuba, has encouraged and supported
several insurgencies, especially in Latin America.
2. Support to the Government
External support to the incumbent government is
described by the supporter and its allies as foreign aid or
assi-tance, or counterinsurgency support.
"All aid c-:-tended to a foreign s3ate stands to benefit the
government in power and to that extent all foreign aid is
countersubversive. But some aid is more so."
Military assistance and special aid to police forces is
designed to strengthen the internal security situation to
ccunter the insilrgency. The motivation of another country
to support the incumbent government in the struggle may be
to preserve the 3tatus quo or to maintain or achieve
dominarce by frustrating the insurgent's bid for an
independence that could create too independent a state in a
8Modelski, in Rosenau: 25.
9Modelski, in Rosenau: 25.
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region the supporter dominated or seeks to dominate. The
supporter may seek to achieve some ideological objective
such as the defeat of the ideologically alien insurgent
faction, y.10 If faction y is supported by another state,
B, state B is now also in conflict with faction x as well as
indirectly with state A. In this situation, the insurgency
becomes a "proxy" external war between state A and state B
as well, at the risk of actual external war. If both A and
B were to send troops to support their factions, "the
internal war would take on the character of an external
war."'i A constraint on the scope and level of external
support supplied is the concern that such support may
provoke increasing aid to the opposing side, and even risk
outright external war between the opposing supporters.
There are dangers in the government becoming
overreliant on external support. External supporters must
take care to not let the conflict become "their" war and to
fight the host country's battle for them. Over-reliance may
lead to reducing the faction's legitimacy as a valid
domestic political force with the moral right to represent
the majority of the population, subjecting it to accusations




necessarily consistent with the majority of the host
country.
External support allows the government to refrain
from making changes in policy which might otherwise be used
to reduce the internal support for insurgency. External
support to the government alters the Dahlian calculus for
the political and economic elites of the costs of
accomodation relative to that of repression, interfering
with the ability to evolve to a competitive regime.
Subsidizing the government's war effort lowers the
comparative cost of government repression against the
opposition.12 This has the effect of discouraging the host
government leadership's motivation for accomodation
(carrying out reforms), since the costs of repression are
being subsidized by its external supporter.
G. REASONS FOR US COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT
The United States backs counterinsurgency efforts in
other countries for a combination of reasons, including
security, political (domestic and international), economic
and ideological motivations. Support of foreign
governments' military counterinsurgent operations are
justified under rationale and military doctrine which
include: to encourage and assist allies and friends of the
12Dahl, Robert, Polyarchy: 15.
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US in deterring aggression and coercion; to ensure US access
to strategic resources; to reduce Soviet influence and the
Soviet military presence throughout the world; to ensure
geopolitical security, such as overflight rights, access to
military bases, and to maintain secure lines of
communication; and to defend and advance the cause of
democracy, freedom and human rights. According to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in their "Doctrine for Joint Operations in
Low Intensity Conflict,"
the most significant threat to US interests.. .is not
found in the individual cases of insurgency.., rather it
results from the accumulation of unfavorable outcomes
from such activities. Such outcomes can gradually
isolate the United States, its allies, and global
trading partners from the Third World and from one
another. .... It can precipitate the gradual shifting of
friends and allies into positions of accomodation with
interests hostile to the United States.13
The US perception of insurgent struggles against
foreign governments to be threatening to itself stems partly
from a common view among US policymakers of revolutionary
insurgency as being Soviet-inspired, and if not directly
caused then at least encouraged and supported for further
exploitation and creation of additional proxies such as
Cuba, the spread of Soviet influence, and even creation of
Soviet military bases. US reaction against insurgency is
related partly to its evolution as a major power who wishes
'
3jCS Pub 3-07: 1-3.
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to maintain the status quo because it sees any political
changes to the present international situation as
threatening to its superior position.
US doctrine states that a major cause of insurgency in
less developed countries (LDCs)
...is the failure of political and social institutions
to incorporate the general populace into the
modernization and developmental process. ...The
inability or unwillingness of a developing nation to
meet the real or perceived needs of its people provides
a fertile ground for unrest from within the society and
for groupr and other nations wishing to exploit such
unresL..
14
US doctrine acknowledges that, "The US recognizes the
legitimacy of popular unrest and may be supportive of it in
instances where it goal is self determination or democracy."
However the US fears that "US national interest may be put
at risk" wheli groups opposed to US goals exploit this
"instability.,,15
Stated objectives of the US as an external supporter
include restoring "stability," generally interpreted as
returning to and maintaining the status quo of the incumbent
government remaining in power, or even to install
"democracy," while the insurgent group ceases military
operations and abandons its objective of overthrowing the




Achievement of these various goals may require contradictory
policies. Achieving democracy is inconsistent with a
counterinsurgency strategy which relies on mainly military
meapurpq in o12riuif of a military victory or a 9- t1lement
resulting in near-capitulation of the insurgents.
While the US often perceives revolutionary insurgencies
as threatening, "the threat is ambiguous, indirect, and
involves protracted commitments in dubious circumstances
often in support of unworthy governments.,16
H. REASONS FOR US PROBLEMS IN COUNTERING INSURGENCIES
There are several constraints hindering the formation
of US counterinsurgency strategy, and its ability to be
implemented to prosecute the conflict and achieve
termination csnsistent with US goals.
Unconventional conflicts, in addition to blending the
political, psychological and military dimension of
warfare, are risky enterprises because they are easily
protracted, defy simplistic solutions and are highly
susceptible to escalation. US political leaders do not
want to be told there is no solution -- that what
appears to be a problem really is a condition. 7
1. US Strategic Culture
US policy toward countering insurgences reflects
symbols associated with American political and military




counterinsurgency policy, in limiting its counterinsurgency
support, and in successfully terminating the conflict are
also due partly to cultural influences.
a. US History and Ideology
One of the problems is the US's own
revolutionary history, its democratic ideology and image of
itself as a proponent of democracy throughout the world.
This is incompatible with the image of supporting military
repression against a popular movement claiming to want to
increase their self-determination, as many insurgent groups
insist. This acts as a constraint on the extent to which
the US can rely on military force to achieve a victory in
its counterinsurgency effort.
b. US Arrogance and Quick-Fix Mentality
Another aspect of US culture impacting on its
difficulties in developing countezLnsurgency strategy is the
American tendency to approach national security matters with
an illusion of omnipotence, a national feeling of
invincibility and morality. US policymakers approach
national security matters embodying the "can-do" American
national character. They often act as though political and
cultural problems are capable of being mastered by ingeneous
schemes. It is the American way to believe that problems
can be solved and that they can be solved quickly.
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A lack of patience leads to a desired quick-
fix mentality, making it difficult to deal with a situation
which requires constant attention over a long duration.
This is related to another cultural aspect complicating the
development of counterinsurgency strategy, which is a US
tendency to reduce complex conditions to problems lending
themselves to a solution with simple answers. Countering
insurgency effectively requires a complex, multi-part
response. These cultural factors contribute to the
temptation of responding with military force.
c. Division Between War and Peace
Another factor affecting the United State's
ability to achieve termination of an insurgency resulting
from a negotiated settlement is that the US has historically
drawn a sharp distinction between war and peace.
"Traditionally, Americans have insisted upon defining 'war'
and 'peace' as distinct and mutually exclusive states."'18
But, once provoked and with the decision made to
use military force, Americans have justified the
employment of force in terms of moral principles.
The national American aversion to war is
responsible for the "all-or-nothing" approach;
that is to say, total victory over the enemy in an
ideological crusade to make the world safe for
democracy..."
'
8Bacevich, et al.: 6.
19Holt: 9.
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Thus, once it is involved in such a conflict, US
policymakers tend to not want to compromise on their
conditions for achieving an end to the conflict. But this
phenomenon conflicts with a tendency among the American
public to want to end the conflict.
d. Perception of National Interests
Americans have mixed emotions regarding the use
of US miltary power. Americans are willing to incur costs
and sacrifices for wars that impinge upon well-defined,
self-evidently vital US interests. If not perceived as
important to those interests, however, consensus over
supporting the use of force diminishes. This is perceived
by many US policymakers and military members as a lack of
national will. However, the lack of support is due more to
a lack of consensus over the threat, and whether the ends,
the objective of the counterinsurgency effort, justify the
means and the cost, and whether the means and even the
objective are morally sound. Counterinsurgency efforts in
other countries such as El Salvador come to regarded by the
majority of Americans as peripheral objectives in a non-
strategic area. This leads to a lack of consensus and
widespread loss of support among the public and thus their
representatives in the legislature for continuing supporting
the counterinsurgency effort.
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American distaste for and dissent over the Vietnam War,
as well as the war in Korea, demonstrates that
persuading Americans to fight for relatively limited
interests, for obscure purposes and with quesitonable
strategy and tactics that challenge American ethical
norms and provide no clear criteria for progress, will
provoke dissent and resistance within American
society.2
e. US Approach to War and Winning
The US approach to war and winning complicates
the termination of LICs. The US prefers wars of dedicated
national purpose, for decisive, total war, with peace made
unconditionally. The Korean War was the first war fought by
the US since 1812 that did not end with outright military
victory over the enemy. "The frustration and impatience
with an inconclusive war was a new experience for an
American people reared on a tradition of victory. ,21
The United States tends to view warfare as a
zero-sum game, where one nation's gain is the other's
symmetrical loss. This is another factor inhibiting US
efforts to achieve an actual negotiated settlement which
would involved some concessions and compromises on the part
of the US. According to Lee, an Army officer writing on




attitudes are reflected in and magnified by the US political
system.22
Both US military and civilian leaderships have
difficulty in accepting the requirements and focus to fight
a LIC during what is ostensibly peactime, resulting in a
failure to give the US's support effort of
counterinsurgencies in other countries the sustained
attention they require. For example, according to a group
of Army officers conducting an analysis of US military
policy in El Salvador, the US has failed to place a priority
on attention, personnel and resources devoted to its
counterinsurgency support effort.23
f. US Difficulties in Formulating Strategy
The US political system often has great
difficulty defining specific objectives and, when
appropriate, using military power and coordinating its use
with other policy elements to achieve them. According to
the group of army colonels writing on El Salvador, the US
effort has lacked well-defined objectives, a comprehensive
plan of action, or an appreciation of the resources required
to sufficiently prosecute the insurgency, and are unable to
see the conflict in whole, instead addressing problems
22Lee: 17.
23Bacevich, et al: i-x.
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piecemeal.24 Defining limited political objectives and
constraining operations to conform to such objectives then
negotiating conflict termination short of all-out
destruction of either side are not part of the US military
training or assigned responsibilities. According to another
military analyst relating US strategy to conflict
termination,
The fact that we do not think clearly about conflict
termination should be of no real surprise. To think
clearly about how wars should end presupposes that we
think clearly about how wars begin; that we think
clearly about strategy; that we think more about ends
than we do about means; and that we know what is
important to use, why it is important, and, as a result,
understand the risks that we will accept to defend those
interests and objectives. Since we do not always do
these things well... it is not astonishing that US
thought on conflict termination is poorly developed.25
A major reason why US thinking on conflict termination is
weak relates directly to the strategy formulation process US
planners use, and the way they tend to use it.
...at critical junctures during the strategy formulation
process, political decisionmakers have.. .failed to
provide the necessary political guidance which military
strategists require if they are to develop military
24Bacevich, et al: i-x.
25Dunn, in Cimbala and Dunn: 175.
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strategy and conflict termination options and
alternatives.26
g. US Cultural Insularity
The US's relative geographical isolation has
contributed to producing a cultural insularity which results
in widespread cultural ignorance and ethnocentrism, which
can limit the effectiveness of national security policy in a
less developed country. US policymakers tend to approach
national security matters ill-informed as to the cultural
sensitivities of the host country, of both the supported
faction and of their insurgent opponents. Cultural
arrogance often leads Americans to disregard the experience
of non-Americans, including reluctance to recognize advice
of their host allies when contrary to their own
recommendations. US policymakers and military advisors have
at times failed to take into consideration or to comprehend
the determination and resolve of the insurgents due to their
ignorance of the host country's history, traditions and
national character.
US counterinsurgency support tends to result in
a massive infusion of American culture into the host country
and intervention in other than strictly military matters.
This may have the result of a destruction of the host




pec:eption of the government as a puppet of US influence.
Another result can be the introduction of methods and
weaponry not appropriate to the culture, development level,
and budget of the host country or the nature of the opponent
and type of conflict, rep lting in increased dependence on
the T7S and possibly exacerbating their aconomic problems.
h. Big-War Bias
The IS must be able to mix both military force
and political mpdns to achieve a viable settlement to an
insurgency. However,
A certain legaliatic strain in US foreign polisy
predispos,-s Americans to regard 'peaceful solationz' and
the use of force as an either/or choice; the
realpolitik application of boch simultaneously sits
poorly with many.27
US counterinsurgency strategy must combine a prudent and
selective application of military forces in conjunction with
other instruments of policy.
Depite recent changes in recently published LIC
doctrine and in military structure to respond to LIC
probiems, for both doctrinal and organizational reasons
countering revolutionary warfare goes deeply against, the
grain of the US military.
... the war in Indochina showed that the US military
finds it much more difficult to respond to the sort of
27Motley: 16.
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wars now underway in Central America -- where political
and military factors are equally important and
inextricably enmeshed.2
Traditionally, the US military is a big-unit,
high-tech miUitary. Countering guerrilla warfare genErally
requires small units and fairly simple technology. Although
significant improvements have been made, such as the
development of light infantry divisions and various special
forces organi-. _ions created and expaided, the US military
is extremely reluctant to modify its big-unit, high-tech
orntatio.-9 The US military leadership encounters
problems in supplying the host government forces with the
appropriate weaponry, strategies, and tactics relevant to
changing insurgent tactics as the phases of the insurgency
evolve, and -.n providing and implementing the right mixture
of military force and reforms necessary to actually resolve
the conflict.
i. Crisis Reaction vs. Preventive Strategy
Often by the time the US becomes involved in a
particular insurgency the conflict has already piogressed to
the point where the government is in immediate threat of
being defeated. At this point with the insurgents strong




the insurgents may be relying mainly on tactics approaching
that of semi-conventional warfare and have the upper hand
militarily.
US military support is generally very effective
at this phase of the conflict and gives government forces
the ability to achieve military superiority and hold back
the insurgent offensive. US counterinsurgency support is
often successful in reinforcing host government forces
enough to achieve a more stable situation so the government
is not in imminent danger of being overthrown. As the
security forces increase in strength and effectiveness,
however, the insurgents may revert to a strategy of
protracted guerrilla warfare. US counterinsurgency support
has been generally less effective against this phase of
insurgency and faces difficulty in achieving termination of
the conflict.
2. Constraints on Use of Military Power
There are inherent limitations in the ability to
which a major power can use its enormous apparatus of
coercion in support of counterinsurgency. The major power
supporting the government has the material capability and
military resources to "out-escalate" its insurgent opponent.
However, because of other economic demands on the state,
such as competition for social programs and business
support, pressures may build up against supporting a
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protracted conflict not perceived to be critical to national
survival.
In a protracted, "limited" conflict there are many
bystanders, both international and domestic, ready to judge
the counterinsurgency effort critically. These bystanders
tend to hold the major power supporter to a higher standard
of accountability than the insurgents. Increasing numbers
of the domestic and international public may begin to view
the counterinsurgency effort as immoral and emphasize the
lack of democratic characteristics of the government the US
is supporting. This is another constraint on the extent and
methods of military force used to counter the insurgency and
the attempt to terminate the conflict militarily.
3. Need to Form Strategy Consistent with Cultural
Constraints
US policies related to their counterinsurgency
support effort have often made errors in ignoring the extent
to which American culture conditions the prospects for
success in policy. A government that wages a war
consciously or unconsciously in disregard of its own culture
invites failure. 30 Rather than finding fault with American
political culture, we must realize that culture and its
derivation style in warfare place practical limits on what
US policymakers should attempt to accomplish. This
30Motley: 13.
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understanding is needed to design counterinsurgency and
termination strategies which work within US cultural
limitations."
Before policy involving the direct use of American
forces in future conflict is implemented, policy makers
must analyze the integrity of US interests involved, the
scale of military effort required and the mood of the
American public, in order to ensure a realistic
understanding of the implications, costs and
consequences of military involvement.32
4. Further Constraints on US Counterinsurgency Policy
For US support efforts countering this type of
insurgent strategy, time and cost considerations are more
critical than for its involvement in external wars. One of
the goals of the insurgent using a guerrilla strategy is to
extend the duration of the hostilities, thereby countering
the US's traditional goal to end conflicts quickly. US
military planners should include in their counterinsurgency
support and termination strategies the recognition that US
public and congressional support will not last indefinitely
(especially if the costs are high) and international opinion
might be highly critical. Recognizing these limits should
influence the US to moderate its terms for negotiation at an
earlier point and insist on host government reforms, before




policymakers have no choice but to conclude the conflict at
any cost.
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III. NEGOTIATION THEORY APPLIED TO INSURENCY
While a great deal has been written about the causes
of revolutionary insurgency and of their progress, very few
studies have addressed the termination of an insurgency for
an outcome other than a successful revolution. During the
US involvement in the Vietnam conflict many commentators
addressed the issue of how the US could end the war or
withdraw from its involvement. However, a literature survey
conducted for this study found almost nothing devoted to the
question of how to achieve conflict termination of an
internal war, insurgency, or low-intensity conflict, and how
the processes and requirements of achieving a negotiated
settlement differ from that for an external war. This
chapter begins by covering the possible outcomes of an
insurgency. Underpinning this study is the assumption that
to achieve the stated US long-term goal of stability and
democracy in other countries experiencing a revolutionary
insurgent conflict, the best outcome in most situations is a
negotiated political settlement. This chapter applies
negotiation theory to the problem of insurgency, an exercise
which, according to the literature survey carried out for
this study, has not been done in the past. The goal is to
identify factors or conditions that appear to be necessary
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to achieve a negotiated settlement mutually acceptable to
the parties involved in an insurgency. This application of
negotiation theory also produces a list of indicators which
can be used to measure the progress of a counterinsurgency
strategy toward achieving effective termination. Chapter
Four will examine counterinsurgency strategies and apply
these factors to gauge and compare the effects of the
strategies on the ability to achieve favorable conflict
termination of a revolutionary insurgency.
A. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF INSURGENCY
1. Outright Win by One Side
An insurgency may end in the complete defeat of one
of the sides, either the insurgent faction or the
government, resulting from a military victory. After an
outright win the losing faction will likely cease to exist
as a military and political entity, to be exterminated more
or less as an organized force. If the conflict ends with
the destruction through force of either of the factions, the
incumbent government or the insurgent group, negotiations
usually do not occur.
George Modelski, a distinguished international




outright wins by either side are not satisfactory
indicators of the degree to which the interests at issue
have in fact been frustrated or accomodated. ... the
apparent simplicity of the outright win solutions is
deceptive, for it creates illusions and misconceptions
which may hinder the task of reconstruction after the
internal war has ended.34
The destroyed faction may lose its military capability but
covertly retain some of its political organization and
support and attempt to rebuild itself to re-emerge
militarily at a later date. The more brutal the repression
against the insurgent faction and its sympathizers, the less
likely they will evolve from a disloyal opposition to become
a semi-loyal or even loyal opposition.
2. Capitulation
Insurgency may end in surrender by one of the
factions. If the surrender is not unconditional then the
termr of the surrender need to be negotiated. Unconditional
surrender is known as capitulation. A faction may choose to
surrender if it suffers intolerable losses or if its
resources are depleted. This could occur through the
severing of a faction's ties to its internal population
support base or its external supporters, or the loss of
critical leadership. A faction might also be induced to
surrender .f it believes that the opposing faction has
34Modelski, in Rosenau: 125.
35Linz: 17.
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obtained vastly superior resources and that the opposing
side is willing to continue prosecuting the conflict for a
long period. An agreement may be imposed by one side upon
the other (capitulation), but this is the result of a
military victory and is not considered to be a negotiated
settlement.
3. Stalemate
If the insurgency does not result in the decisive
defeat of either side there are several other possible
outcomes. If no significant military progress has been made
for an extended period of time the conflict is at a
stalemate. This is the current situation in the struggle
between the Salvadoran government and the coalition of
insurgent groups known as the Farabundo Marti Liberation
Front (FMLN), which have been in a situation of stalemate
for over five years. "Perceiving the stalemate, the
belligerents may agree that a continuation of hostilities
would result in no gains to themselves. '36 In the case of
a stalemate there is more likely to be a lot of hard
bargaining between the negotiators, and negotiations will be
more protracted than if one faction had dominated, depriving




extended stalemate may be the situation most conducive for
conflict termination and favorable negotiated settlement
(favorable in the sense of most likely contributing to long-
term stability). The definition of an "extended" time
period is as yet unclear, and the perception of this
condition seems to vary with the particular conflict and its
participants. The US has been involved in the past in
limited, prolonged stalemated conflicts in which termination
negotiations went on intermittently for years without
significant progress nor apparent gains from the continued
fighting.
A stalemate is a threshold for producing either an
agreement or another round of escalation. At this point the
external supporters face a choice of essentially five
decisions: to escalate military support to attempt a
military victory; to try to negotiate an end to the
conflict; to maintain the level of support necessary so its
side does not lose but does not win either, resulting in
further protracted conflict; to withdraw support altogether;
or to adopt a new strategy to try to reduce the opposition
to the government through other than military means. There
is a danger that protracted military stalemate may lead to
ever higher levels of external support, depending on the
level of commitment of the external supporters to their host
factions and on the supporters' political, economic, and
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military ability to maintain escalation. External actors
can try to intentionally induce a stalemate to achieve a
settlement, by either withholding aid from either side or
deliberately providing it to the weaker faction to create an
extended balance and hopefully cause both sides to agree to
negotiation.38 This condition requires actual or tacit
cooperation by the external supporters of each side to limit
their support to achieve such a stalemated balance.
B. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
1. The Agreement to Negotiate
Fundamental to the success of the negotiation
process is the willingness of participating factions and
external supporters to successfully negotiate an end to the
conflict. 'The chief impediment to the best of peace plans
is the underlying cynicism of all the key parties. '39
Stalemate is one of the factors which can induce this
willingness to sincerely reach a negotiated settlement.
Conditions other than actual stalemate can also prompt this
desire by both parties simultaneously, despite a generally
held dictum that "the expectation of future success is a
38Modelski, in Rosenau: 143.
39Newsweek (Jan 11, 1988): 30.
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reason for opposing a ceasefire, the expectation of future
setbacks or stalemate a reason for accepting one."''0
Stalemate is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to achieving a negotiated settlement. The
decision to terminate (or continue) a conflict is a
combination of both external and internal pressures. For
cases of insurgency where the participants are dependent on
external support, the actual or anticipated reduction of
external support on one or both sides and, even more
favorably, its balanced reduction or even curtailment are
assumed to be necessary to achieve the willingness on each
side to produce a negotiated settlement. Necessary for this
to occur is the desire for at least the external supporter
of one side and preferably that of both to genuinely want a
settlement to be reached.
Other than a stalemate, many of the factors which
induce a faction to welcome negotiations at a given time are
also often interpreted as reasons for the other side to shun
them at the same time: they are perceived as zero-sum (what
strengthens the bargaining position of one faction weakens
that of its enemy). When one side wants to talk often the
other does not, or at least no longer wishes to compromise.
4Pillar: 87.
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2. Insincerity of Offers to Negotiate
A faction may indicate its readiness to make peace
even if it expects no negotiations to result, either because
it generally wants peace or because it believes that ".a.
manifest willingness to negotiate coupled with ostensibly
real moves to bring a peace conference into being will have
propaganda value.'41 A faction may respond positively to
an offer to negotiate, even if it actually prefers to delay
negotiations or does not believe that the effort will
produce any results. It may do this to affect international
and/or domestic public opinion and gain political capital by
demonstrating peaceful intentions and avoiding the blame for
continued hostilities. A side may try to continue the
support of its allies or negatively affect the morale of the
opposing faction's forces through offering to negotiate, or
trying to dissuade the opposing faction or its external
supporters from increasing military resources.
A common tactic is for a side to intentionally
appear to negotiate while actually making proposals they are
fairly certain include terms unacceptable to the other
faction. By including an indication of readiness to
negotiate with a demand that the other faction make a
substantive concession, a faction can initiate or agree to
4"Randle: 85.
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negotiations without making it appear it is acknowledging
defeat or anxious to reach an agreement at any costs.42
Often the incumbent covernment and its external
supporters are reluctant to negotiate with the ins,.rgents
because the negotiation process itself can add to the status
of the insuirgents. The mere opening of talks confers on the
insurgents a position of equalit, and improve3 cheir
legitimacy.43
The belief that the other side is not ready to
negotiate, or fear that an acceptance or offer to negotiate
will signal weakness to the opposing faction can discourage
the leadership of a faction from taking steps aimed at
initiating negotiations even when it would oth-zLwise favor
them.
A faction's leadership may postpone its willingness
to negotiate if it believes it is unlikely to attain certain
crucial objectives through a settlement at that time. If
onp of the factions perceives it izL winning, its leaders may
still be willing to negotiate a ceasefire, due to war
weariness or because they assess that they can gain as much
at the negotiating table as they could in combat, without
the costs of continued hostilities. Anoth r condition
"
2Pillar: 82.
43Modelski, in Rosenai: 131.
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prompting such willingness is the actual or anticipated
reduction or withdrawal of critical external support, even
before the effects of such_ reduction are felt.
C. TERMINATION CONDITIONS
1. Compromise
One determinant of a faction's willingness to
compromise on negotiating conditions is its capability and
means to attain its objective. "Changes in the perceived
possibility of direct achievement" may account for changes
in the readiness of factions to negotiate sincerely and in
its level of flexibility.4' Domestic and international
opinion and support as well as access to resources affect
this readiness and flexibility.
At tne minimum, the proposed terms by either side
must not threaten the continued existence and political
identity of the other faction. Another essential condition
is that the host government offer an amnesty to the
insurgents, and make arrangements which will actually
guarantee the security and protection of the insurgents and
their supporters. Such an arral.gement can be made through
the services of an international commission to supervise
inplementation of the agreement and compliance with its
44Pillar: 46.
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provisions, with international reprisals against the faction
violating the provisions.
2. Inflexibility
At times the expense in resources and personnel by
either one of the primary factions or the external
supporters may be so great and the conflict so bitter that
the belligerent in question may refuse to compromise on
their negotiation conditions on the grounds that they need
to justify the expenditure thus far by achieving their
maximum objectives.
US policymakers involved in a counterinsurgency
support effort have often tended to discourage the host
government from pursuing a negotiated settlement given their
assessment that "the time is not ripe for terminating the
war on ternis that realize fully the military investment
already made."'45 As long as they have the resources to do
otherwise the US and the host government are usually not
willing to terminate the conflict unless under conditions
which satisfy all or nearly all of their objectives.
Victory is considered to be the full achievement of
announced conflict aims through military actions, and may be




3. Contribution of Changes in Political Leadership
Once a conflict has begun, US political and military
leadership are generally reluctant to agree to its
termination on anything but favorable terms, preferring
instead to continue fighting as best they can, not wanting
to recognize or admit that a conflict has been lost or
cannot be decisively won. Also,
Because the professional honor of the military leaders
is at stake, they are loathe to accept defeat and
continue to hope for a military breakthrough; there is
no substitute for victory."
Often an elite responsible for the initiation of involvement
in a conflict which will result in perceived failure when
the conflict is concluded is reluctant to withdraw from the
conflict. Such withdrawal can mean the end of the
leadership, or could require the admission of its failures
and mistakes.",47 This is another reason why a change in
political leadership of either faction as well as that of
either of its external supporters is a condition favoring
the achievement of a settlement. Historically, the
termination of a long and stalemated war has been frequently







The settlement terms demanded by the US and the host
government to gain their maximum objectives are considered
unreasonable and unacceptable by the insurgents, who will
continue the conflict as long as they retain the ability.
In a protracted guerrilla struggle, even once negotiations
begin they can be drawn out by either side to stall if they
believe they are capable of achieving a military gain in the
future. Thus, the offer to and acceptance of an agreement
to negotiate, in themselves, are not sufficient indicators
to gauge the success of a given counterinsurgency strategy
toward achieving a political settlement, although they are
necessary conditions for an agreement to occur. Flexibility
of the negotiating conditions of one, and more favorably
both, sides is a more accurate measurement of the progress
of counterinsurgency strategies toward bringing about
effective conflict termination.
The negotiation demands offered also depend upon the
extent to which each faction's leadership hopes to achieve a
peaceful relationship with the other faction in the near
future.49 Maintaining peace following a cessation in
hostilities should not depend merely on the capacity, or
lack thereof, of the defeated side to regain its strength, a
49Randle: 186.
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situation known as a "negative peace". Effective, long-run
termination achieved through a negotiated settlement is more
lucky to result in a situation of positive peace which will
reduce the need for future resort to arms to bring about
changes through the fulfillment of some of the more critical
objectives on each side. This situation is more favorable
for creating a situation of actual long-term stability than
a strategy which produces an outright military victory of an
insurgency or a settlement involving capitulation.
D. BARGAINING POSITIONS
Deciding to end an insurgency through negotiations, the
antagonistic factions have to negotiate the terms of
cessation of hostilities as well as attempt to resolve the
political ditferences which initially caused the insurgency.
"Neither side has prevailed and the outcome, usually a
compromise, may represent various degrees of partial success
for both sides... "50 If both sides have the resources and
will to continue the conflict then each will have to
compromise on its maximum objectives to some extent. Since
the insurgents have not been victorious militarily the
existing government will remain in power, although the
political system may be modified as part of the settlement.
Both factions are likely to continue to exist in some form
5 Modelski, in Rosenau: 123.
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since a faction would never allow itself to be negotiated
out of existence as long as it had the resources to continue
fighting.
The militarily stronger party is generally more able to
demand favorable terms in a settlement. However, military
superiority can be offset to a varying extent by domestic
and political support as well as desire for a long-run
stability. The relative success of each faction's military
struggle as well as their degree of actual and anticipated
domestic and international popular support, their morale,
and continued access to resources affect the relative
strength of their bargaining positions.
E. RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL
One gro.p of termination strategies views the
participants in an insurgency, including its external
supporters, as "rational actors," having a consistent set of
objectives motivating their participation in the insurgency
and behaving in ways they calculate will bring them closest
to their objectives. The rational decision regarding
termination is the product of two separate estimates: the
prediction of events if the conflict continued, and the
predicted progress and outcome of a negotiated settlement.
If a faction decides that there is potential to achieve
their goals either with or without a settlement, then if
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assuming they are rational actors, their decision rests on
their perceived costs and benefits of using each method. A
faction may be discouraged from seeking negotiations if it
expects that the costs of war required to induce the enemy
to come to an acceptable agreement will be too great, or the
delay too long. Anticipated costs as well as the
anticipated value of various strategies change for each side
during the course of an insurgency, and influence a
faction's willingness to negotiate as well as the expected
value of a possible negotiated agreement.
Clausewitz assumes rationality on the part of the
belligerents.
Still more general in its influence on the resolution to
peace is the consideration of the expenditure of force
already made, and further required. As war is no act of
blind pass-on but is dominated by the political object,
therefore the value of that object determines the
measure of sacrifices by which it is to be purchased.
This will be the case, not only as regards extent, but
also as regards duraiton. As soon, therefore, as the
required outlay becomes so great as that the political
object is no longer equal in value, the object must be
given up, and peace will be the result.5
We see, therefore, that in wars where one side cannot
completely disarm the other, the rational motives to achieve
peace on both sides will rise and fall on each side
according to the probability of future success and the
required outlay. If these motives were equally strong on
51Clausewitz: 125.
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both sides, they would meet in the center of their political
differences. 2 Clausewitz is describing the ideal conflict
situation, in which rational opposing factions have
sufficient information to make cost-benefit calculations of
when to terminate a conflict However, the reality is that
the participants involved in an insurgency conflict are not
always using strictly rational judgment for their
policymaking -- at least not apparently rational according
to the relative weights and values used by the opposing
faction.
Ideological beliefs may undermine the ability of each
side to effectively terminate conflict. While seen as some
observers as "irrational," it should be recognized that each
side is factoring the value of these ideologies into their
rational equation of whether to continue fighting. When
certain ideological motivations dominate among the
leadership of one of the opposing factions they may appear
to act more irrationally, favoring the ideological values at
the expense of other interests.
F. IDEOLOGICAL AND POWER POLITICAL VALUES
In a revolutionary conflict, competing principles and
ideologies may cloud the issues and interfere with rational
thinking. Each participant in an insurgency, both the
52Clausewitz: 125.
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primary internal factions and the external supporters, holds
values related to its involvement in the conflict. These
values can be divided into two types: ideological and power
political. Ideological values are beliefs held by the
majority or at least the leadership of the faction, such as
religions or "secular theologies," such as Marxism,
democracy, capitalism, and anti-communism.
... often, when the basis for a particular war policy is
obscure and remote from considerations of the state's
security, when in fact that question does not even arise
in the context of the war, then... war aims sometimes
become ideologized. Policymakers feel impelled to
rationalize war aims in terms of an official or
prevailing ideology, which makes it difficult to
distinguish the ideological from the power political
bases of a war, because leaders often do cloak power
political values in ideology."
The reverse can also be true: ideological motivations can
be cloaked utider alleged security interests.
Power political values relate to actions considered
necessary to preserve the state or the faction and to
maintain their well-being. These values are not limited to
oi-y t_:ise t se ssary to maintain the existence of
these entities but also includes their perceptions of their
security needs. Principles which factions or states view as
security interests often are only remotely related to the
g.al of self-preservation of the entity.
53Randle: 7.
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The incumbent regime naturally regards itself as 'the
state,' and insurgents, aspiring to be the state, consider
their movement as if it were already a state. Each faction
is likely to seek the continued existence of the entity of
which they are members. Thus, a faction cannot be expected
to agree to any proposed conditions which would in any way
threaten, refuse to recognize, or no longer recognize its
continued existence.
G. NECESSITY OF DE-IDEOLOGIZATION AND DEVALUATION
Before a negotiated settlement to end an insurgency can
be successful, "both the ideological and the power political
values of at least one of the belligerents must become less
intensely supported.' 4 The competition for values and the
intensity of which the ideologies are held must be devalued
on at least one side for negotiations to progress. Each
faction must begin to perceive less threat to their values
from the opposing side and/or that the settlement process
can realistically play a part in sustaining those values and
in reducing the threat to them.
"De-ideologization" can occur under the following
circumstances:
1) If the ideological values over which the war is
fought are rejected or de-emphasized by one of the
factions, the incumbent government, or key external
54Randle: 14.
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supporters; a serious military or political event can
diminish the intensity of a value conflict over which
the war is being fought (such as a change in leadership,
with the new leadership holding a different hierarchy of
values), or if the ideological values are discredited in
some other international situation of which the faction
is aware;
2) the leadership of either or both factions decides
that peace is essential and of greater value than the
conflicting values, e.g. if power political
considerations such as survival of the state are at
stake. "When the state's existence is in the balance,
identified values may well have to be sacrificed, at
least temporarily;"'55 or,
3) political or social change within the state or
faction results in their discrediting and displacement
of the ideological values by others.
A successful negotiated settlement to end an insurgency
also requires a "devaluation" of relevant power political
values, or a change in interpretation of the threats to
security or dcefinition of ecurity. This could take place
through a change in government, displacement of a group of
power political values by another, or changes in the
internal political situation of a key external supporter.
The intensity of commitment to certain values is
related to the will of the elites to continue fighting
versus other means of meeting their objectives, as well as
having the resources and support, including popular support,
to continue the conflict. "If the stakes are chiefly
indivisible, so that neither side can get most of what it
55Randle: 12.
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wants without depriving the other of most of what it wants,
negotiations are less apt to be successful. ''56 At least
one side must somehow be influenced to accept fulfillment of
fewer objectives to reach an agreement. Ideally for
successful termination with the best chance for long-term
stability, both sides agree to less than their maximum
conditions.
An insurgent struggle may become too intense and bitter
at times to permit agreement on even the most minimal terms
of a settlement. At times the issues provoking the war are
so ideological and the ideology so firmly held by one or
both factions and their supporters that even a partial
settlement cannot be achieved without at least one side
becoming "de-ideologized:" A "rearrangement of aims"57
must occur. War weariness due to the sheer length of the
war could "de-ideologize the war issues as a result of heavy
casualties or economic costs, and the parties could agree to
a ceasefire and a military settlement, but perhaps not a
political settlement. 'v 8
There is probably no generalized calculus enabling us to
predict how and when de-ideologization will proceed far
enough, when the important thresholds will be crossed,
permitting negotiations and a settlement. But when the
56Pillar: 24.
57Modelski, in Rosenau: 143.
58Randle: 199.
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elites and decision makers, and possibly the public...
hold intensely to the ideological and power political
values over which the war is fought, peace will be
impossible. The intensity of commitment to these values
must diminish if a settlement is to be made, or even
attempted.59
If the leadership of a faction believes they have the
advantage of righteousness or motivation over their
adversaries due to holding strong ideological values the
faction may keep fighting despite military setbacks which
rationally would have induced them to scale down their
conditions.
H. ADJUSTMENT OF NEGOTIATION CONDITIONS
Whether a faction chooses to continue using armed force
to achieve its objectives depends partly on the nature of
the objective. "Some war aims can be achieved only through
agreement, because they require the continued existence and
willing cooperation of the other side." 60 Other objectives
might be attainable only by exterminating or expelling the
enemy faction rather than by reaching an agreement.
This, at first glance, appears to be the rule in the
case of insurgency: the objective of the insurgents is to
overthrow the government; the objective of the government





Aftex all, logic suggests that if realistic grounds for
compromise existed within the country then the opposition
would not have had to resort to arms for its political
motives to be met. The existence of the insurgency
indicates the weakness of any internal mechanisms for
compromise, and the conflict tends to polarize whatever
moderate elements may have existed.61 The leadership of
each faction may hold its values so strongly that compromise
is inconceivable, and lines of communication may not be
available. Each side in an insurgency is considered a
traitor to the other, and is suspicious of the enemy ever
aliowing it to exist witoiunt a struggle.
1. Room for Compromise
However, there may be more room for compromising
than is at first apparent, especially after a protracted
period of internal war. The primary rationale behind the
revolutionary insurgent's will to fight is nit just tc
overthrow the government. The real motivation of many
insurgents as well as their supporters and sympathizers is
to achieve actual economic and social change and political
representation. Feeling ,.nable to accomplish this through
the "legitimate" political procss, they turn to the method
of armed conflict to create a new government.
61Pillar: 24.
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Many insurgent supporters co Id be persuaded to
forego Ghe armed option even while the present government
re.iained in place if a varying level of their objectives
wtre fulfilled through valid reforms and a sincere guarantee
of protection of their safety were offered. Armed
revolutionary insurgency is, for most participants other
than a hard-core, an option turned to as a desperate measure
when all other options to achieve actual change and
pro+-ection against government repression are perceived as
invalid. Grounds for compromise may exist in the form of
host government willingness to sincerely offer valid reforms
and allowing the former insurgents to continue unprosecuted
and in existence as a political entity, as well as the
insurgents' willingness to compromise on its objectives and
an impartial observer available to mediate conflicts and
ease tensionq, and ideally able to enforce these conditions.
2. Barriers to Compromise
At times ti- factions, weary of the war and
convinced they are stalemated, are willing to work out a
compromise political settlement, but the external
supporter(s) may not be ready to negotiate, and may even




Extreme ideological motivation in a faction's
critical external supporters may severely restrict what the
negotiators can accomplish. Supported factions highly
dependent on external aid fear aggravating external
supporters for its curtailment may result in their
capitulation, destroying their chances to achieve an actual
negotiated settlement. External supporters may demand
participation in the settlement talks, to stipulate
settlement conditions, and may attempt to veto terms they do
not favor. In the case of insurgencies in the Central
America region, because of the dominant position of the US
and its heavy involvement in insurgent conflicts in the
region, the willingness of the US to support negotiated
settlements or at least not undermine them is crucial.
3. Means of Overcoming Compromise Barriers
If the leadership of a key external supporter
changes their attitudes and policies toward the insurgency
or are induced by domestic public opinion and/or
international pressure into doing so they will become
increasingly interested in negotiating a settlement and
increasingly willing to lower their expectations of
fulfillment of objectives.
The agreement to negotiate does not lower the
barrier of a faction's lack of confidence in the other
side's willingness and sincerity to negotiate a settlement.
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A methcd of building this trust and reducing suspicions is
through including confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the
negotiation settlement. CBMs can be used to progress from
one threshold level to another. A threshold of settlement
is a p( int in the negotiation process where after resolving
a certain issue affecting their interests, both parties
proceed to the next stage of negotiations. The thresholds
demark the limits of the major issues or issue areas in the
negotiations. "There may be a series of thresholds for each
of the major issues of the war."'63 Thresholds for the
political settlement tend to be more difficult to cross than
those for the military settlement. The leadership of a
faction may be willing to accept a ceasefire but not the
costs to their values of a complete settlement.
In addition to focusing on the military aspects of
increasing confidence between potential adversaries as a way
of avoiding conflict through misperception or mistake, CBMs
can be broadened to include other measures not strictly
military.
Confidence-building approaches are an attempt to counter
the dangerous features of a competitive international
environment in which potential adversaries mistrust each
other and their intentions, and have inadequate
information about their capabilities."
63Randle: 14.
64Child, in Bagley, 1987: 53.
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CBMs are intended to reduce the risk of conflict
through misunderstandings. They can lower international
tensions by slowing down or reversing the spiraling
interaction of suspicion, insecurity and arms buildup. The
features which CBMs require to be successful are also
essential conditions to achieving and maintaining a
successful settlement to an insurgency and its related
international tensions, such as openness, predictability,
incrementalism, mutuality, balance and symmetry,
communication, and verification.
In a settlement agreement CBMs should be combined
with measures of positive peace to resolve the fundamental
economic, social, and political causes of the conflict.
"The process of building confidence is a slow and cautious
one in which each individual step must be tested and
verified before proceeding to the next one."'65 Successes
at a modest level can be used incrementally to build up to
more ambitious stages.
Consistent with the conditions already specified for
successful negotiated settlements to insurgencies, Jack
Child, an academic with a former military background who
specializes in the Latin American region, insists that for
CBMs to play a successful role in achieving peace,
65Child, in Bagley, 1987: 54.
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fundamentally, the adversaries must genuinely want to
avoid conflict. If one (or both) of the adversaries
believes that aggression is worthwhile, or that a
military solution is possible and is a zero-sum game in
his favor, or if he is motivated by ideological
convictions which permit no compromise, then CBMs will
either break down or merely serve to prolong the
conflict. ,,6
1
In the stage preliminary to negotiations to end an
insurgency, peace "feelers" are sent to the other faction,
either secretly or more openly.
There will be talks about talks, consideration of
preconditions of negotiations, and agreements upon
procedures such as the form of the conference, invitees,
agenda, and conference procedures...
4. Necessity of Unbiased Mediator
To successfully achieve a settlement a disinterested
third party or parties must play the role of broker in
mediating the dispute between factions. External actors
with no direct interest in the war are ideal honest brokers.
An offer to mediate by a state or oiganization is more
likely to be accepted if an actor has not become too closely
identified with either of the protagonists or with the
issues of the conflict.68 The mediating role may be
effectively carried out by international or regional
organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization




of American States (OAS), third country officials, or
representatives of non-governmental organizations such as
the Roman Catholic Church. The mediators must try to settle
the original insurgency as well as subsequent issues which
have emerged such as disagreements among the external
supporters, and attempt to contain the insurgent conflict.
I. COIPONZNTS OF A NZGOTIATED SZTTLEMENT
A negotiated settlement to end an insurgency is
comprised of two main parts:
1) the military settlement: the cessation of hostilities
and immediate questions related to military forces,
which leads to the "negative peace", disposition of the
armed forces of all factions, including terms to prevent
resumption of hostilities; and
2) the political settlement: negotiations on political,
economic and legal concerns to restore positive peaceful
relations and a definition of the status of the
insurgents and of the future political relations of the
insurgents to the incumbents.
Often a faction involved in an insurgency will require
a ceasefire as a condition for agreeing to even preliminary
peace talks -- this way, the military situation is known and
more constant during negotiations. However, in other cases,
such as in negotiations throughout the 1980s related to the
Central American insurgencies, the military settlement does
not occur until political questions have been addressed in
detail, and military operations continue while political
negotiations take place.
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A faction will likely choose to not accept a ceasefire
prior to further negotiations if it is not sufficiently
satisfied with its comparative military position and thinks
it is likely to improve its position with continued
fighting. Due to communications advances it is now easier
for negotiators to coordinate combat and diplomacy, making
it more feasible for a government to negotiate a political
settlement prior to achieving a ceasefire. It is more
likely now than in previous decades that the military
settlement will not precede the political settlement.69
The co±tinued conduct of military operations can
dramatically affect the progress of the negotiations.
A change in the military position of one of the
belligerents will affect its bargaining position and
hence its peace policy... A battle won or lost may cause
the negot;.ators of the state or faction to alter their
war aims and even result in one party's breaking off
negotiations entirely.0
If military operations have ceased and political
negotiations are ongoing, the insurgents need to retain
enough military resources and support to insure better terms
in negotiations by being able to use credibly the threat to




1. Military Settlement Issues
The main issues of the military settlement are to
stop the fighting and provide for the peaceful disengagement
of troops and their withdrawal from the areas of combat.
"The character of the military settlement will depend in
large part upon the relative power positions of the factions
at the time negotiations began and during their
progress. ,,71
A problem unique to termination of insurgencies is
what to do with the troops of each faction, how to
demobilize them and integrate them i.ito thp state. If the
government faction remains in power the government forces
will remain the national military. Guarantees must be
provided for each faction that the armed forces of the other
will no longer be a threat. The fate of the insurgent
forces is a negotiating concern which will be very
challenging for negotiators to resolve. Insurgent forces
may be handled in various ways. They may be demobilized as
a military force and disarmed, with guarantees for their
civil liberties, or they may be permitted to remain in
existence as an independent armed force within a particular
area of the state, or even become part of the national
*"Randle: 95.
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military force.'2 Unless these questions are resolved the
existence of two forces in the same country is likely to
result in the future outbreak of hostilities. The question
of the long-term disposition of the insurgents' armed forces
may be part of the political settlement. The ceasefire
agreement may also contain provisions for the protection of
persons and property in zones of combat or areas used by the
forces of either faction."
While the military settlement may contain provisions
for the temporary military administration of certain areas
of the state, it is generally better for achieving long-term
political stability that this issue be left to the political
settlement.
2. Political Settlement
If sufficient de-ideologization occurs a political
settlement can be negotiated. To Modelski, "the persistence
of a settlement depends on the development of techniques for
sharing power and its fruits equally between the
parties. '7 4 A political settlement should address the
primary interests of all key actors to be implemented
effectively. The negotiation facilitators may help to
72Randle: 86.
73Randle: 86.
74Modelski, in Rosenau: 148.
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determine the state's constitution or arrange the framework
to create a national constitutional assembly.
Various conditions of the political settlement may
include: the insurgents agree to disarm and disband; with
guarantees for their lives and property, they return to
their former places of residence and resume their prewar
status; they may be permitted to form their own political
party and take part in the peaceful competition of political
parties."
a. Elections
The factions may conclude that the competition
between them will eventually be by peaceful political means,
through their relative ability to win the support of the
enfranchised population. Elections have become, for
mediators of insurgent conflicts, "the generally accepted
mode for resolution of the fundamental questions relating to
the future of states."7 6 If elections are the means chosen
to resolve many of the political questions between the
factions, then the negotiators should help to establish
certain rules for them as well as arrange for an independent
election supervisory commission to ensure and determine the




b. Political Power Sharing
Often insurgents do not trust the fairness of
the election process constructed under the rules of the
incumbent government nor that the protection of their
political candidates can be guaranteed while campaigning,
and so they insist that a power-sharing arrangement be
formed prior to elections.
Under this arrangement a temporary coalition
government is formed to create a situation of political
power sharing. The insurgent faction remains in existence as
a separate political party, with the understanding that they
will be guaranteed a fixed minimum number of posts in the
government for at least a minimum period of time.
The political settlement should also contain
provisions guaranteeing the civil liberties of all parties.
The settlement condition of creating a coalition government
will be more likely honored if the factions have about equal
bargaining power and the leaders of both factions conclude
that,
they must tolerate the inconvenience of cooperating with
the adversary rather than bear the costs of continued
fighting that promised no dramatic alteration in the
relative power position of the antagonists."'
This is analogous to what is often referred to a
a Dahlian calculus: when the costs of accomodation are
"'Randle: 90.
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perceived to be less than the costs of repression, or in
this case, the costs of conflict, then the elites decide to
cooperate.78 Both sides may agree to this situation hoping
that in the future the other faction can be eliminated from
the coalition, either through peaceful political competition
or subversion. 9
c. Partitioning
In a situation where no grounds for compromise
can be found but both sides have wearied of fighting the
state may be partitioned. The factions may agree that the
military and political forces of each shall remain in
existence, but physically separated from the other. In this
case, the assignment of territory will be intensely debated.
Each faction will want to continue to maintain its
authority in areas controlled by it at the time of the
ceasefire, and each will want to obtain control over
areas that will enhance its future political (and
economic) position.8"
Separations may be designed as temporary or permanent. It
may result in the creation of a new state. The partitioned
area for the former insurgents may be autonomous or
independent. The partition solution may be necessary if the
factions cannot de-ideologize enough to cooperate. This is




a form of negative peace and generally has a low probability
of long-term stability.
The faction leaders will not look kindly upon a division
of their state and will probably regard the partition
solution as temporary, until combat can be resumed at
some time after a respite or until a future conference
can somehow resolve the question of the unity of the
state. '
J. COMPLIANCE
A negotiated settlement must address questions of
compliance, such as how all parties can be made legally
responsible for fulfilling the terms of a peace settlement,
and assurances that the factions will abide by the
settlement. The parties should attempt to provide each
other with assurances that the peace terms will be
respected.8 2 The settlement might vest authority in a
supranational or international organization to police the
terms of the agreement. Settlements have a better chance of
being successfully implemented if an international
commission supervises the implementation of the agreement.
Violations and complaints of violations should be handled by
a peacekeeping commision composed of representatives of




K. ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT
From the above analy ii a list of ccditions or factors
can be made which apparently need to be fulfilled to achieve
a negotiated settlement to terminate a revolutionary
insurgent conflict in a situation where both the governmcnt
and the insurgents are receiving critical external support.
Each tactor is accompanied by a list of indicators which
apparently contribute toward its progress. There is a lot
of overl-p as well as interdependence among these
conditions, in that changes in a particular indicator may
affect more than one factor, and some factors may also be
indicators which in turn affect othcr factors. A summar: of
these factors and indicators appears in Table 3.1. The
factors are listed in what appears to be in their order of
priority.
The ability of a counterinsurgency strategy to achieve
such a settlement can be aisessed by speculating tneir
effects on each of these factors. The act:al necessity of
each of these factors to produce an agreement and the
effects of the various strategies on these factors under
varying conditions can be analyzed by comparing actu,'.
strategies implemented in the attempt to counter different
insurgencies and seeing how the differing strategies
affected each of the factors and the subsequent outcome,
either an actual settlement or increasing or decreasing
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progress toward one. Another method, which will be applied
in Chapter Five, is to look at a particular insurgency in
which the government's strategy has varied over time to see
how the factors were affected under each of the different
strategy periods, then assess whether the potential for
achieving negotiations was increased.
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TABLE 3.1: CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION OF INSURGENCY
Factor Indicator
Desire/Sincerity - Offer and acceptance of negotiations
of each side to want settlement
- Settlement talks by representatives
of each side
- Increased flexibility in stated
settlement conditions
- Reduction in domestic sympathy for
either side
- Domestic pressure for conclusion to
conflict
- Agreement to work on compromise
- Actual agreement on minor (inclusion
of CBMS in settlement process)
- Government reforms offered
- Government reforms implemented
- External supporter credible pressure
for an agreement




- International pressure and support
for an agreement
- De-escalation of conflict
- New leadership of government and/or
factions
- Support of military for settlement,
or external pressure on military to
achieve and honor settlement
Extended Stalemate - No significant military progress by
either side
- Balanced external support
- No significant changes in increasing
legitimacy and popular support for
either side
- Decreasing domestic support for both
sides
Primary External
Supporters - qtatements in favor of negotiations
Want Settlement - Support offered to negotiation
process
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- Credible threats to make support
contingent on reforms and/or
negotiations progress
- Reduced domestic political support
for backing conflict
- Increasing economic difficulties in
supporting country
- International political pressure
against continuing (especially among
supporter allies)
- Increasing threats to supporter from
sources other than insurgency
demanding priority resources
- Participation in settlement talks
- New leadership in supporter
cuuntries
- Threats by opposing supporter to
escalate if agreement is not pursued
De-escalation of
conflict - Actual decre&se in external military
assistance
- Reduced number or absence of semi-
conventional operations by insurgents
- Reduction in domestic internal
resources
- Reduction in number and intensity of
offensives/counter-offensives
- Increasing constraints by external
supporters on types of military aid
- Reduction/absence of external
supporter advisors/troops
- Reduction in number of insurgent/
military casualties
- Reduction in number of civilian
(noncombatant) casualties
- Increased non-military aid by
external supporters
- Creation of viable political
options to conflict
Flexibility of Terms
Offered By One - Devaluation of power political
or Both Sides values (reduction in perceived
threat from opposing faction,
increased threat from competing
priorities, or perceived increased
security from settlement commission)
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Deideologization (new leadership,
war weariness, discrediting of
ideology)
Impartial Third- - Mediator accepted by both sides
Party Mediator (including external supporters)
Proposed Meeting on - Meeting place acceptable to both
Neutral Territory sides
Necessary Conditions- Amnesty offered by government
Included in Proposal- Security guaranteed by commission
- Provisions for fair elections,
incorporation of insurgent group as
political party
- Provisons for political power
sharing
- CBM provisions
- Effectively addresses issue of
disposition and organization of
troops of each faction, acceptable
to both sides
- Arrangements for impartial
international commission to supervise
agreement implementation, compliance
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IV. STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE CONFLICT TZRMINATION
This chapter will examine various counterinsurgency
strategies which have been proposed or implemented by the US
during the history of its participation in counter-
insurgency, including its experience in the Vietnam
conflict, along with some strategies used by other countries
in their experiences with counterinsurgency efforts, such as
the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. The chapter develops
a typology of ten categories of counterinsurgency
strategies, and briefly outlines the means available to
carry out each type of strategy. Chapter Three identified
the factors which appear to be necessary to achieve a
negotiated political settlement to terminate an insurgency
and conditions which indicate progress toward achieving such
a settlement. Chapter Four will examine how each of the
counterinsurgency strategies affects the factors which are
in turn assumed to affect the likelihood that successful
termination will occur.
The term 'conflict termination' is used to describe more
than merely the cessation of armed hostilities, a ceasefire,
but involves a situation where a mutual political choice is
made to achieve less than maximum political objectives on
each side, using the minimum necessary force to achieve an
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end to hostilities. "Only those who can point the way to
peace without victory, yet peace with at least some of the
hoped-for fruits of victory, can claim they have 'solved'
the problems of war termination. '8 3
According to a study on conflict termination written in
the 1970s,
...the termination of war is a complex process and that
process varies in its purposes and details from one case
to the next. However, understanding that it is a
process leads to a search for strategies, rather than
for particular terms or conditions, related to
successful termination.84
This suggests that counterinsurgency strategy should and can
be planned with attention to its impact on effective
termination. Conflict termination is the responsibility of
national policymakers as well as of the military leadership.
A corolliry to devising strategies to achieve conflict
termination of a revolutionary insurgency is understanding
what started it and what keeps it going. The conflict
continues when the two sides have incompatible, unrealized,
minimum objectives, and have enough human and material
resources which they are willing and able to allocate to the
conflict. Thus, the conflict will continue until there is a
change in either the goals, expectations, resources, and/or
"
3Fox:viii.
"Foster and Brewer: 2
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calculations of the future situation and likely outcomes of
at least one of the belligerents.
To achieve 'successful' termination, in most cases of
insurgency it is necessary to create conditions most likely
to produce a positive peace through arriving at a mutually
acceptable agreement. 'Success' is defined as sowing the
c. Aditions for a stable government, both political and
economic. The ideal result of US counterinsurgency
assistance would be 1) reduced confict in the host country
and translation of political opposition into the formal
political process; and 2) the long-term stability of a
civilian, democratic government which is not threatened by
its own military and does not threaten its neighbors nor US
interests, is generally supportive of US interests, and is
able to gradually decrease its dependence on the US and
build a functioning economy. This study assumes that
achieving a mutually accepted, negotiated settlement is
fundamental to achieve these results in the case of most
revolutionary insurgencies at an already advanced state when
the US becomes involved. This study does not address the
issue of preventive strategies, nor how to 'nip insurgencies
in the bud.'
To many Americans, by at least 1970 the Vietnam conflict
seemed interminable and unwinnable, full of contradictions
and offering little or no gains to the interests of the US.
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But, as an examination of the range of proposed counter-
insurgency strategies shows, "The all but unanimous call for
some kind of end to the war does riot conceal deep
differences as to what kind of end should be sought and how
high a price should be paid for it."8 5 There are tradeoffs
for the US between achieving earlier termination, fuller
realization of military policy objectives, and the levels of
sacrifice and resource expenditures continuing the conflict
would entail. The range of strategy types applied to counter
ongoing insurgency conflicts is shown in Table 4.1, below.
Within a given strategy, the emphasis on the several means
available may vary. Table 4.2 shows many of the options
available.
A. A STRATEGY OF MILITARY VICTORY
A strategy designed to achieve military victory against
another country's insurgent opponent involves using the
superior military force and capabilities of the United
States, either directly against the insurgents or
indirectly, through supporting the host government to
demonstrate that the costs of continuing the conflict will,
8 Fox: viii.
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TABLE 4.1 TYPOLOGY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES
1. Pursuit of Military Victory: through completely or
mostly military means
a. Sudden, Severe Blow: Undertake an all-out
offensive or attack on strategically-chosen
critical target to achieve annihilation or
capitulation
b. Gradual Escalation: Gradually increase offensive
actions and criticality of targets to make opposing
faction realize the increasing costs of continuing
the conflict so they will concede to US/host
government terms
2. High-Low Strategy: Counter the various insurgent
phases with an appropriate level and type of response,
increasing and decreasing assistance as insurgent
tactics change.
3. Dual-Track or 'Fight and Talk' Strategy: Offer to
negotiate a settlement while simultaneously keeping
military pressure high to induce opposing faction to
sincerely want settlement
4. Induce Stalemate: Provide just enough military
assistance so the government is not overthrown to try
to induce a stalemate to create a situation favoring a
settlement
5. Dealing Directly with Insurgent External Supporters:
Curtail insurgent support, with the goal of either
achieving miltary victory or inducing stalemate to
achieve negotiated settlement
6. Attempt to Dissolve Unity of Insurgent Organizations:
Attempt to exploit factionalism among insurgent group
to reduce morale, coordination, effectiveness
7. De-escalation: Reduce level of conflict to indicate to
opponents good faith in wanting to negotiate and
creating a 'propitious climate' for settlement
8. Increasing Government Popular Support and Legitimacy:
Attempt to reduce the number of insurgents through
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reforms to make populace less willing to use military
means to oppose the government
9. Emphasis on Appropriate Intelligence and Surgical Use
of Force: Make providing rapid, tactical intelligence
the focus of the counterinsurgency campaign; followed
by discriminate strikes and small-unit operations
against insurgents
10. Combined Strategy: Use a mix of the instruments of
national power, to achieve various goals. i.e., a
military victory, stalemate favoring a settlement, or
to buy the government time to reform to increase
government legitimacy and reduce popular support for
the insurgents. Involves various mixtures of each
instrument and emphasis on different tactics.
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TABLE 4.2 INSTRUMENTS TO IMPLEMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGIES
1. Military Means:
a. Direct Intervention with US troops
b. Indirect Intervention: US advisors, military
training, military assistance (lethal and
nonlethal), pressure for military reforms, attempts
to increase military professionalism
2. Political Means: assistance to strengthen political
institutions
a. civic action programs
b. pressure on government and security forces to
respect human rights
c. pressure and assistance for judicial reform
d. pressure and assistance for political reforms








e. provision of loans and credits
4. Information assistance
a. intelligence support, training, equipment
b. guidance and pressure for development and debate
c. assistance with developing psychological operations
(PSYOPs)
5. Diplomacy
a. Support for negotiation efforts
b. Assistance to improve cooperation and relations of
host government with other nations
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the insurgents and its supporters, far outweigh the
potential benefits. This calls for damaging or destroying
the insurgents' principal means of economic and military
support, cutting them off from external sources of supply,
causing a large number of insurgent casualties, as well as
targeting for demonstration effect against the will and
unity of the insurgents, to either defeat them outright
militarily or to induce them to capitulate, to seek
negotiations on US/host government terms. According to this
strategy, to achieve a military victory or to achieve
bargaining power sufficient to receive the desired terms,
the US and host government must take all-out offensive
operations which inflict a high level of pain against the
insurgents and destroy as much of their fighting capability
as possible (short of use of nuclear weapons). Proponents
of this strategy insist that the US and its supported side
should resist entering into negotiations, or at least avoid
approaching them seriously, until the sufficient level of
pain and damage have been inflicted, unless the insurgents
agree in advance to US conditions. US resistance to
pursuing a negotiated solution is defended by the rationale
that, "In dealing with the communists, control commissions
and similar bodies cannot be relied on to exact compliance
with the terms of an agreement. There is no substitute for
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clear and present force with the determination to use
it ,,86
The necessary level of pain required varies and is a
matter of debate among US strategy analysts. Means used to
carry out this strategy include use of strategic bombing and
other massive firepower.
1. Sudden, Severe Blow
One type of strategy for achieving military victory
is known as a sudden, severe blow. Proponents of this are
critical of the US strategy of gradual escalation and
believe that the United States should practice immediate,
large-scale escalation and all-out war. Some propose even
introducing US troops, to achieve a rapid, victorious end to
the conflict. Other strategists argue against the use of
troops in this type of LIC, and insist they should be used
only as a last resort.
Advocates of the sudden, severe blow argue that
inflicting such large costs suddenly against the insurgents
will have a negative effect on their morale and will to
continue the fight, and persuade them to rationally turn
toward peace (at US terms) or be destroyed. Proponents of
this strategy criticize political constraints on the
military effort, accusing them of impeding a rapid end to
erSharp: 155.
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the conflict. They believe the political leadership is more
concerned with placing constraints on the scope, form and
pace of military operations than with allowing a strategy to
be implemented which is directed at a particular outcome or
has a high probability of victory. The politically imposed
constraints reflect a desire by policymakers to avoid
provocative or politically sensitive actions that might lead
to escalation or to undesirable domestic or international
political consequences. However, advocates of lifting
political restraints claim that the political leadership
tends to focus on avoiding certain undesirable outcomes
rather than on the means to achieve particular desirable
outcomes.
2. Graduated Escalation
This st-ategy calls for slowly increasing the
frequency and severity of attacks, to gradually increase the
level of pain through "carefully calculated doses of force,"
raising the threshold as the insurgents do not cooperate.
Part of the rationale behind this strategy is reluctance to
introduce the full military power of the US against a weaker
opponent due partly to the constraints of domestic and
international opinion and economic cost, and partly for fear
of provoking a response in kind or even direct intervention
by the opposing external supporters. Such a strategy may
involve a 'carrot and stick' approach of offering incentives
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to the insurgents to reduce their aggression but grac.ially
increasing reprisals if they do not. Since th- level of
conflict increases over time such a strategy will l.Aksiy
result in a protracted conflict.
B. HIGH-LOW STRATEGY
Onlike a gradual escalation strategy, a "high-low"
strategy follows the insurgency phases described in a Maoist
insurgent strategy. According to this guidance the United
States would carry out "low" support consisting of only
advisory military assistance functions unless the insurgents
make a transition to conventional warfare. Tbhi. phase would
require "high" operations to counter large insurgent
formations. The US should withdraw or withhold from using
its ground fo-ces, returning to "low" support when the
insurgency is in a guerrilla warfare phase, "...when
operations would involve the kind of lengthy, wearing sweeps
and small-unit fights that characterized the Vietnamese
war."87 In this view, each phase can be countered with the
appropriate type and level of response. Overall costs of
the conflict are lowered, and US military support is
increased at times when it can be most effective. This
strategy also assumes that conflict will be protracted.
87Killebrew, in Cimbala and Dunn: 1:6.
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C. DUAL-TRACK OR 'FIGHT AND TALK' STRATEGY
This strategy calls for indicating the intention to
pursue a negotiated settlement but sustaining heavy
offensive military operations, even during the negotiation
period, to maintain pressure on the opposing faction to
negotiate and ensure favorable conditions for the US. This
strategy is advocated by Admiral Sharp, the Commander-in-
Chief of the US forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC) during four
years of the Vietnam conflict, who recommends that military
operations against the insurgents "should be pursued to the
point where they will be prepared to make major concessions
in exchange for relief from the pressures applied against
them.88 The US should continue military pressure, make US
general objectives publicly known, and demonstrate its
resolve to continue supporting their side of the conflict
while awaiting signs that the insurgents are ready to
negotiate toward some achievement of those objectives -- and
maintain that pressure during negotiations. Such a strategy
argues against the method used by the Johnson administration
in the 1960s whereby the US frequently paused in its bombing
campaign to gauge North Vietnamese reaction and demonstrate
US willingness to bargain.
88Sharp: 153.
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Proponents of 'fight and talk' insist that cessations
of these pressuros without exacting major concessions in
advance provides the insurgent faction the ability to
exploit the lull to rebuild and resupply enough to sustain
aggression and encourage its external supporters to increase
their support, then break off negotiations as soon as they
have regrouped and regained the necessary forces to resume
fighting. This strategy insists that to be successful in
its quest for military victory or to persuade insurgents to
reach a settlement on mostly US terms, the United States
must exhibit complete confidence in its ability to win the
conflict and indicate its willingness to use the full range
of its military superiority if necessary, and that the US
must not let itself be driven to 'premature' negotiations in
its eagerness to resolve the conflict. Proponents of this
strategy assume the existence of a link between a successful
military offensive and the successful push for a settlement
on US terms, believing that if enough territorial control is
established that battlefield successes can be translated
into negotiation terms.
D. INDUCE STALEMATE
This strategy involves providing just enough assistance
to the host government so that its military capabilities are
balanced with those of the insurgents and their level of
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internal and external support, so a stalemate is induced.
It assumes that a situation of extended stalemate can be
used to create general war weariness on both sides and
convince them to try to work out a negotiated solution
instead of continuing the conflict. Achieving a stalemate
in a case where the insurgents also receive external support
involves either actual or tacit cooperation with the
opposing supporters or sufficient intelligence and analysis
to know with a large degree of certainty the extent of
support and how to counteract it, and/or the ability to cut
off the supply to the insurgents through interdiction
efforts.
E. DE-ESCALATIOV
This s'-:ategy involves reducing the scope and scale of
the military effort against the insurgency, although not to
the point where a stalemate is induced or the government can
be overthrown. The goal is to gain the ability to continue
military support for the longer period of time needed to
counter an insurgency, and to provide the types of military
assistance more appropriate to fighting an insurgency.
According to this strategy, de-escalation is needed to give
the United States the ability and confidence to demonstrate
to the insurgents and their supporters that the nation is
more willing and able to accept the costs of continuing the
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conflict over a long period of time. Because of the reduced
military cost and the reduced level of collateral damage and
casualties resulting from the more appropriate weaponry and
training, the effort is less costly economically and
politically. Thus US policymakers will conceivably have
less difficulty in maintaining domestic consensus for the
counterinsurgency support effort. Observing this ability
and resolve, the insurgents' incentives for delaying
negotiations will be reduced and they will become more
willing to reach a settlement. Included in this strategy is
the recognition and admission that the conflict will not be
quickly resolved.
Other proponents of this strategy point out that an aim
related to ending the insurgency is reducing the level of
conflict in the country, through means other than
intimidation and repression. In this view, a measure of US
success is when the scale of violence is forced back down to
a level that can be handled by indigenous civil authorities.
LIC in allied countries requires that US forces act in
concert with the forces of the host country... and that
the host country's forces ultimately bear the brunt of
settling their own problems. ...For the US, the
barometer of success should be the operational success
of the host's forces, measured in decreasing requests
for US assistance.89
89Killebrew, in Cimbala and Dunn: 135-136.
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F. DEALING DIRECTLY WITH OPPOSING EXTERNAL SUPPORTERS
This strategy involves trying to end the insurgency or
reduce the level of conflict by lowering or terminating
their external support. Means of support targeted by this
effort may include: politically reinforcing statements that
advocate the political legitimacy of the insurgents' cause
and protest the "immorality and illegality" of the US-
supported counterinsurgency effort; diplomatic recognition;
economic assistance; and the offering of sanctuary as well
as military assistance. This strategy assumes that the
insurgents are highly dependent on their external support,
would be ineffective without it and thus have to capitulate,
that alternate sources of support are not available, and
that external supporters can be persuaded or intimidated
into curtailing their assistance. This strategy may also
involve cooperating to try to induce a stalemate.
G. STRATEGY OF DISSOLVING THE UNITY OF INSURGENTS
This involves attempts to exploit the rivalries and
factionalism within insurgent groups to erode their
organization, cohesion, communications, and ability to
orchestrate offensives and other operations. This strategy
requires knowledge of the insurgents sufficient to be
familiar with potential for increasing factionalism. The
strategist must be familiar with the racial, religious,
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ethnic, and cultural characteristics of the insurgency as
well as political and military factors to understand the
needs, interests, and motivations of the insurgent group.
H. STRATEGY OF APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE AND SURGICAL USE
OF FORCE
This strategy recognizes that insurgents seek to gain
and maintain the initiative through actions that weaken the
government through means such as deliberate acts of terror,
military attacks against weaker security installations,
propaganda, and destruction of the country's economic
infrastructure. Necessary for success in all of these
operations is insurgent security.
Security provides time, protects vulnerabilities and
weaknesses, and most importantly, gives the insurgent
the freedom to exercise initiative. Security is the
insurgent -enter of gravity.90
Accurate intelligence on insurgent organizations,
operations, personalities and goals is necessary to counter
the insurgents' center of gravity. If sufficient
appropriate intelligence is gained, then it is possible to
use military force more efficiently, thus controlling the
level of conflict and preventing escalation. The
intelligence effort and design required for effective
9
°Manwaring, in Cimbala and Dunn: 61.
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counterinsurgency is very different from that for other
types of conflict.
Collection, fusion and analysis of all-source
information should be done at the operational and tactical
levels, not only at th= national and command levels.
Because insurgent forces are highly mobile, intelligence
must be rapidly passed to military forces. Higher level
intelligence organizations often tend to serve their own
needs and tend to be slow in responding or not understanding
the needs of the operational unit. An account of the
intelligence effort supporting US operations in Vietnam
demonstrates the need for tactical-level fusion.
With emphasis on combat rather than intelligence
operations, and concentration of intelligence assets at
division and higher levels, it should not be surprising
that Amexrian units tended to conduct seemingly never-
ending operations moving through the jungle without
contact or making contact under circumstances other
than those determined by the enemy. Given these
conditions, it is understandable that artillery, air,
and man power were wasted against ill-defined
targets."
Collection efforts should emphasize human intelligence
(HUMINT) over more high-tech collection means; in terms of
quality and volume, the best source of intelligence in an
insurgent conflict is from human sources such as prisoners,
defectors, informers, and non-insurgent citizens.
91Manwaring, in Cimbala and Dunn: 68.
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The right type and amount of information can enable
security forces to carry out a series of quick, surgical
operations. This would ideally be followed by moving civil
authorities into the affected areas to implement programs
designed to reestablish local, state, and national
legitimacy.92 Through gaining access to the right kinds of
information a strategy emphasizing intelligence can help
achieve successful, prompt termination.
I. STRATEGY OF INCREASING THE GOVERNMENT'S POPULAR SUPPORT
This strategy assumes that insurgency arises mainly
because some aspect uf tne political system is considered
illegitimate and thus counterinsurgency strategies must be
aimed at restoring legitimacy for the government in as many
sectors as possible, in order to retain and gain popular
support and prevent potential opposition from joining the
insurgents. Instead of relying on force, this calls for
trying to bring about changes in aspects of the regime, such
as its leadership, authorities, military officers, political
system, and economic policies, which are the focus of the
popular discontent contributing to the insurgency.93 This
strategy aims not at killing insurgents but on reducing
92Manwaring, in Cimbala and Dunn: 65.
930'Neill: 279.
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their number by making them less willing to use military
means to oppose the government.
An aspect of this strategy involves US efforts at
nation-building, intended to develop the political, economic
and social structures of the host country to reduce support
for the insurgent option.
J. COMBINED STRATEGIES WITH SEVERAL GOALS
These strategies involve using a combination of the
many means available and calls for the coordinated,
integrated use of force in combination with a mix of other
instruments. Combined strategies may be tailored to the
specific conflict and are more effective if guided by a
common strategy. Advocates of such a strategy believe that
insurgent co,-licts have complex causes and thus a complex
solution and time are necessary. These strategies vary in
the degree and type of their self-imposed constraints, in
the priority placed on the different components, and the
specific mix of instruments and m-aris. The various means
which can be applied in a combined strategy are shown in
Table 4.2.
Many proponents of a combined strategy recoQnip that
"operations in the LIC environment may be of long duration
and require extensive assets."94 Since the combined
94JCS: 1-12.
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instruments "work directly and over a long time," US
policymakers and the public "must be patient to allow the
political, economic, and social forces to work to the
advantage of US interests."95 These strategies assume that
while the primary objective of US involvement in the
counterinsurgency effort is defeat of the insurgents, the
means of carrying this out may not be only through
destroying insurgent units but also trying to increase
popular support for the government through a combination of
such tactics as psychological operations (PSYOP), political
reforms, and civic action programs. Enogh military force
is provided to keep the government from being overthrown but
not enough for it to achieve an actual victory against the
insurgents, while the other components, such as reforms and
training, are given time to work to eventually result in the
loss of support for the insurgents and gains in strength and
legitimacy for the government.
K. EFFECTS OF COIN STRATEGIES ON TERMINATION INDICATORS
1. Mainly Military Strategies To Achieve Victory
Chapter Two outlined some of the political and
cultural constraints on US counterinsurgency efforts, such
as the problems of countering the 'power of the small
belligerent' engaging in a strategy of attrition in a
95JCS: 1-15.
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protracLt-d insurgency. US planners must take these
realities into account when designing counter-insurgency
strategies.
o major considerations are time and cost.
History suggests that the US public and legislature will
likely be unsupportive of a large-scale military effort (in
terms of cost, and especially personnel) over a long period
of time when such actions are not perceived to be in the
vital interest of the United States, especially if pursuit
of the goal and methods used appears to be inconsistent with
US ideology and the public feels they are being drawn into
ever-increasing support while "progress" in the effort and
its benefits are not obvious. A long-term, large-scale
military effort does not appear to be feasible given the
political, economic, and ideological constraints identified
in Chapter Two.
As the US experience in Vietnam demonstrated,
popular support may have more impact on the use of force or
a termination decision "...than any single military
strategic or tactical condition. "" A strategy of gradual




a.Medium-large Scale, Long-term Effort
A drawback of a gradual escalation strategy which
relies almost exclusively on military force is that it does
not resolve the fundamental conditions that contributed to
the insurgency, but all-out military effort has been
constrained so the conflict can drag on indefinitely. Over
time, as the populace perceives the gradually increasing
costs of the conflict but see little benefit to the US, the
amount of resistance to continuing the conflict will expand.
This large-scale military effort over a long period of time
offers the least likely chance of being able to survive the
constraints on US policy and will likely result in the least
consensus.
Given that a large-scale, long-term military
support effort does not seem to be viable given the
constraints on US policy, US policymakers have two primary
options. One alternative is to pursue a massive, even
unrestrained effort over a short period of time to pursue
rapid termination in the form of an outright military
victory or through causing enough damage and erosion of
insurgent will to persuade them to capitulate.
b.Small-scale, Short-term Effort
Given the advanced phase of a revolutionary
insurgency at which the United States usually becomes
involved, and assuming that both the insurgents and the host
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government are being supported by major powers, a short-
term, small-scale military effort does not appear to be a
realistic option. It would not be effective because of the
initial weakness of the government and its armed forces
(which contributed to the extent of the insurgency), the
scope of military assistance needed to offset that being
received by the insurgents, and inattention to the weakness
of the government and other conditions contributing to the
insurgency. A long period of time is needed to make
improvements in the organization, training, and equipment
shortfalls in the government forces.
c.Small-scale, Long-term Effort
A small-scale military support effort by the US
must be sustained by the US for a long period of time, and
supplemented by the use of non-military instruments.
Through this strategy, the US can demonstrate that it is
willing and able to accept the costs of continuing the
conflict over a long period of time. Because of the reduced
military emphasis and increased attention to political
considerations such as human rights abuses and reforms, the
effort is less politically costly as well. The US
policymakers involved in such a counterinsurgency effort
will conceivably have less difficulty in maintaining
domest;.c consensus for the counterinsurgency support effort.
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d.Large-scale, Short-term Effort
Against other types of insurgents who do not
place as much emphasis on political organization and
ideology as the participants in an advanced revolutionary
insurgency, such as urban "terrorists" or insurgents relying
on a foco strategy, a primarily military strategy can be
effective in achieving a "victory," as the defeat of
insurgent groups in several Latin American countries such as
Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia in the 1960s and 1970s
demonstrates. However, insurgent movements with a great
deal of political organization and ideological motivation
are more firmly embedded into the political and social
fabric of the population and have such widespread influence,
sympathy, supoort and control that they cannot be defeated
using force alone without incurring massive noncombatant
casualties, widespread destruction to the country and
economy, and increasing the risk of adding to the disloyal
opposition.
By the nature of internal warfare, it is
difficult to distinguish actual insurgents from non-
insurgents, and supporters from sympathizers, and both from
"legal" political opposition, and all the above from those
who have no strong opinion and just want to be left alone.
Over-reliance on unrestrained .ailitary methods will likely
102
polarize society further and may result in increased support
for the insurgents.
Some critics of a strategy relying on mainly
military means argue that the massive offensive capabilities
of the US such as strategic bombing and firepower are
ineffective if not combined with appropriate and timely
intelligence. Without this type of information and its
rapid transmission to military forces, the massive firepower
is being expended against territory with little effect
against either insurgent will or capabilities, with
potentially counterproductive results.
Such offensive measures have a limited effect
against a low-technology opponent who can adapt to counter
such methods. Against such an opponent the gains are
generally minimal in comparison to the extent of the US
support effort and the cost of the resources expended: the
effucts of offensives relying on massive firepower have
often been offset by camouflage, adjustment of tactics to
using smaller units, and other adaptations.
The Vietnam conflict also demonstrated a lack of
understanding among US strategists on the extent of the will
of the insurgents and the effects on that will of the
bombing operations. US policymakers also made the error of
assuming that their own rational calculations were shared by
the insurgents, not realizing that the value of their
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ideology and goal was factored into their rational calculus
of continuing the conflict.
Attempting a strategy of military victory through
either a rapid buildup or through graduated escalation may
result in the host government and its miltary forces
becoming over-reliant on the US, both for iti war effort and
for other functions. When a rapid US military buildup is
used, the host country does not develop an ability to
prevent such a situation from resurfacing. The conflict
will likely return since the fundamental weaknesses which
encouraged the insurgency to reach such threatening
proportions to require US assistance have not been resolved:
a weak, illegitimate government relying on repression to
stifle politiral and economic change, and security forces
which are poorly organized, trained and equipped and respond
crudely to the task of countering terrorist or insurgent
actions. The government may be regarded as even less
legitimate for having to be "bailed out" by a major power
and unable to muster enough domestic support to withstand
such threats on its own. If sub-cultural cleavages such as
race, religion and/or regional differences as well as class
antagonism are involved, then US military support for the
government will likely reinforce accusations of the white,
wealthy, industrialized and foreign power using force in
alliance with their illegimate government to deprive them of
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their rights. This erodes further the government's already
limited legitimacy.
Attempts at termination through a military
victory may successfully end the conflict in the short term.
However, the outcome of a conflict ending in victory for the
US-supported side through a strategy primarily relying on
military measures is a negative peace. Many conditions are
left in place for the conflict to resurface in the future
after the survivors rebuild their political organization and
miltary capability. Coercion will likely be needed to
suppress a resurgence of the conflict. Trying to prevent
such recurrences through military means would result in a
'Carthagenean' peace, forcible extermination of not only
actual armed insurgents but of any possible sympathizers or
perceived potential opposition of any type, as well as a
high level of civilian noncombatant collateral casualties
and destruction of much of the countryside and economy.
Such a 'peace' would require a costly military effort, as
well as great cost in physical damage to the countryside,
economy, and human resources. Also necessary to consider is
the cost to the United States in terms of its domestic and
international image as a democracy, world leader, and
benevolent government. Military victory short of a
Carthagenean peace (which is too incompatible with US
history, ideology, culture, and need for the support and
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respect of its allies) is only postponing the time when the
actual issues need to be dealt with, and increasing the
scope of the problem each time it resurfaces. Even the
option of insurgent (and potential insurgent) annihilation,
if the US supported it, does not bode well for the future
stability and economic potential of the host country and its
ability to create a democracy (claimed to be a goal of US
counterinsurgency support). Such a result would likely have
negative consequences on the host country's continued
dependence on US assistance.
2. Host Country Dependence and Reconstruction
Further complicating a US victory is host country
dependence on US economic support and war materiel:
... even the most successful military intervention is
likely to saddle the US with obligations that will
survive long after the war itself ends. Prudent
policymakers will view the cost of that postwar
obligation... as part of the price of admission to any
small war."
Another consideration following a victorious military effort
is the postwar disposition of the military forces which the
US built up.
Greatly expanded beyond their prewar configuration,
those forces are likely to become a drag on efforts to
restore healthy internal development and may also
complicate American efforts to create regional
stability. ...An army lacking a clear sense of purpose
is likely to become doubly a burden .... The victorious
army that proves troublesome to its own government may
97Bacevich, et al: 47.
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also pose problems for neighboring states. In building
up the forces of one country, the US may inadvertently
create problems for others and for itself.99
US counterinsurgency support should incorporate a mechanism
to draw down the host country forces, such as loaning
weapons only for the duration of hostilities.
3. Fight and Talk Strategy
When the United States is involved in a low-
intensity conflict, the objectives are supposedly limited.
To terminate a conflict with limited objectives, z id to end
hostilities promptly with some but not total success in
achieving these limited objectives, there must be some give
and take on each side -- the aim is not to annihilate the
opposing faction. "The need to 'win' can lead to the loss
of the longei-term relationships and goals that are sought
by trying to 'win' the conflict."99
A problem with the 'fight and talk' strategy is
that unless the US is willing to adjust its expectations of
what can be achieved at the bargaining table and be at least
somewhat flexible on its settlement conditions, then it is
actually pursuing a strategy of military victory despite its
claims to be trying to achieve a negotiated solution.
9eBacevich, et al: 47.
9901son: 37.
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An examination of the terms offered and the amount
of flexibility in those terms indicate whether in reality US
policymakers are pursuing a military victory, in the desire
to achieve their objectives in full while making few if any
concessions themselves. The willingness to negotiate
involves compromise on both sides -- if side is not
willing to give in at least somewhat then it is not
negotiating sincerely.
Tactical success in an offensive may result in less
willingness by the host government and US policymakers to
compromise. It boosts their belief, at least temporarily,
that a victory is possible, and can even inflate their
conflict objectives and thus the settlement conL.iois.
This would result in postponing the offer of US/host
government terms which the insurgents might be reasonably
expected to accept, if the insurgents still have the
capability and will to continue military operations.'10
Another drawback of the dual track strategy is that
in a revolutionary internal conflict, the relative military
positions and successes are often not translated equally
into political success at the bargaining table, as pointed
out in Chapter Three. Considerations other than strictly
military successes affect the relative bargaining strength.
10 Fox: 7.
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Proponents of the US/host government quest for
military victory often insist that the insurgents are not
sincerely approaching negotiations or are not bargaining in
good faith, since their conditions are not agreeable to US
policymakers. A critical look at the content of the
settlement terms offered by each side (i.e., whether they
violate the necessary minimum conditions outlined in Table
1.1, such as the need to not threaten the continued identity
and existence in some form of each faction) and the amount
of flexibility of the conditions by each faction over time
will indicate whether either side is actually sincere in
pursuing the negotiated settlement option.
4. Stalemate
The problem with a strategy of intentionally
inducing a military stalemate is that if not accompanied by
other substantive reforms and credible pressure by the
United States to reach an agreement it may result in a
continuation of the conflict. In the Vietnam conflict the
United States was able to create a stalemated situation in
which the other side was unable to "win" militarily.
However, the war dragged on for years at very high costs, in
economic terms and prestige, until the United States had to
withdraw due to domestic pressures.
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L. REQUIRE 3ENTS OF COMBINED STRATEGIES
To be successful in achieving a negotiated settlement,
a combined strategy must be based on an understanding of the
conflict aims of the insurgents and their supporters and
sympathizers. "Thus war termination imposes upon statesmen
and strategists the highest burden of understanding the
opponent in order to defeat him rather than annihilate
him." °10' A strategy must aim at countering what Clausewitz
would describe as their 'center of gravity.'0 2 Because
the center of gravity of insurgents is popular support, the
most effective counterinsurgency strategies aim at
increasing the popular support of the government and
carrying out actions which would reduce support for the
insurgents.
Termination strategies involve definition of military
conditions and the means for achieving them that are
consistent with and likely to produce political
outcomes acceptable to both sides of a conflict.0 3
As described in Chapter Two, in an insurgency, at least
in its early phases, there is an asymmetry o: military power
and the actor wishing to change or overthrow the government
cannot directly challenge the superior force of the host
government. This requires the application of what Sun Tzu
101 Cimbala: 6.
102Clausewitz, On War: 23.
103Foster and Brewer: 5.
110
calls 'indirect force.'10 4 The thrust of the revolutionary
strategy is to deny the government the support of as many
people as possible. Indirect force is applied through the
use of moral power.
If carefully done, the use of moral influence can
undermine the legitimacy and the position of another
actor by breaking the bonds which unite a people, its
political leadership, and its protective
military/police organization."'0
As government legitimacy is increasingly questioned,
the strength of the government forces can be weakened. By
transforming the conflict from the level of military
strength to focus on a struggle for legitimacy, the
insurgents can not only attempt to obtain enough leverage
and influence for better settlement terms, but also the
power of the small belligerents can be used to strive for
overthrow of the government.
Planners must keep in mind when devising counter-
insurgency strategies that a balanced political-military
effort is necessary. This involves:
1. understanding the insurgent's environment and
its center of gravity;
2. creating the necessary and appropriate
intelligence organization and collection
effort;
"°
4Sun Tzu: 77, 79.
"'
0Manwaring, in Cimbala and Dunn: 60.
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3. creating an effective and efficient security
force; and
4. establishing the appropriate organization and
objectives for the counterinsurgency effort.
These four factors are interdependent, and the shortfall or
absence of any of them will diminish or even negate the
effect of the others.
Military support to the host government can buy time
for it to rebuild and for reforms to take place, in order to
increase government legitimacy and reduce support for the
insurgents. However, if the reforms are not implemented or
substantive, then such a strategy will just set the stage
for a seemingly intractable, interminable conflict into
which the US is drawn into supporting, at great cost, with
seemingly no returns, and no solution in sight.
In a combined strategy, US assistance should be
appropriate to the culture of the host country. The aid
should help the host country's military actually protect the
population; secure, rebuild and develop the economic
infrastructure; isolate the insurgents from the population
through increased intelligence effectiveness; and assist
the civil government in developing its administrative and
service functions. According to this strategy US support
must, in addition to countering the immediate military
threat, addr-ss the problems which are contributing to
causing and exacerbating the insurgency.
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A combined strategy will not succeed if actual systemic
changes do not take place while the US support effort is
ongoing. Stabilization through military and economic
assistance can produce a situation of stalemate which can
persist indefinitely, costing the US a great deal.
For example, training and materiel assistance to the
host military and security forces will not effectively
achieve conflict termination unless organizational changes
occur as well. Serious deficiences frequently characterize
the security forces in countries experiencing revolutionary
insurgencies, such as: personal loyalties which transcend
the formal chain of command; a tradition of semiautonomous
regional centers ot authority which do not respect the chain
of command; lack of leadership skills and technical
proficiency; an inadequately paid officer corps and
resulting widespread corruption; and recruitment and
conscription practices which reflect the social structure of
the society, limiting their effectiveness in defending the
government.
Some of these deficiences are contributory factors to
the insurgency itself. They are a reflection of the
deeper societal problems which permit a revolutionary
movement to take root.10 6
Despite successes of US advisors and training, even if such
training is appropriate to fighting an insurgency, it may
:"'Manwaring, in Cimbala and Dunn: 69.
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not be adequately used to counter the insurgency unless the
senior leadership has acquired and accepted them as well.
To increase the government's legitimacy and effectiveness
the US must encourage organizational as well as technical
improvement among government and military officials, if
necessary by:
...linking specific changes with appropriate rewards as
a final means of leverage if other less confrontational
efforts fail. ...this factor emphasizes building and
equipping a relatively small military force structure
capable of finding and beating an elusive and dedicated
enemy. Numbers and ratios of government troops to
insurgents are not nearly as important as motivation,
training, and appropriate equipment. 1°'
The US must ensure that the types of assistance and
their actual implementation are actually resolving the
problems contributing to the conflict and not exacerbating
them (i.e., 'ne type of military assistance and training
must be appropriate to countering an insurgency).
A combined counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes
"nation-building" support and economic assistance over
military assistance may still have negative effects on the
goal of achieving effective termination. Inappropriate
assistance may in fact be giving incentives to host country
elites to continue the conflict and act to strengthen the
military, at the expense of the authority of the civilian
government. Economic assistance must contribute to
'1Manwaring, in Cimbala and DZ.nn: 70.
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improving the socio-economic structural conditions that
exacerbate the insurgency.
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V. US COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT IN EL SALVADOR
This chapter applies the factors determined in Chapter
Three to be necessary to achieve a negotiated settlement to
end an insurgency to the strategies used by the US over the
last ten years to support the government of El Salvador in
its fight against a revolutionary insurgent faction.
A. METHODOLOGY
This study uses the focused comparison method, applying
a list of factors equally to several cases to assess the
effects of the differing counterinsurgency strategies on the
factors and on the likelihood for achieving a negotiated
settlement. The study divides the case of El Salvador into
six sub-cases by the time period. The time periods are
divided by the differing counterinsurgency strategies used
by the US and Salvadoran government and the Salvadoran
military in its ten-year conflict with a revolutionary
insurgency group, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front.
The time periods are as follows:
Period One: 1979-80;
Period Two: 1981-early 1983;
Period Three: mid-1983-mid-1984;
Period Four: late 1984-mid-1936;
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Period Five: late 1986-1989; and
Period Six: 1990 to a projection extending to the
following two years.
The dominant counterinsurgency strategies by the US and El
Salvador are explained in the text below describing each
period, and are summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Table 5.1 shows the amount and types of US assistance
to El Salvador, and the ratio of economic to military
assistance. Table 5.2 takes the factors and their
indicators described in Table 3.1 as being necessary to
achieve a negotiated settlement in an insurgency, and
applies them to the case of El Salvador. The table shows
how the indicators as well as the counterinsurgency strategy
changed during each period. Changes in the dependent
variable sh-,w whether progress toward a settlement increased
or decreased during the period. The dependent variable was
formed by a weighted composite of negotiation offers and
acceptances of each side, whether settlement meetings
actually occurred, and events when one or the other faction
indicated flexibility in its conditions either prior to or
during settlement talks. Under the assumption that
flexibility in a faction's settlement terms indicates actual
sincerity in reaching a compromise agreement, an event of a
faction relaxing a settlement requirement are weighted by 1,
indicating their highest priority. Negotiation offers and
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acceptances may indicate progress toward a settlement, but
as Chapter Two explained, each side in an insurgency often
agrees to or offers to negotiate even when it has no
intention of actually meeting, or of reaching a settlement
unless on their maximum terms, which is not actually a
negotiated settlement. Because such offers and acceptances
do not necessarily indicate progress but are an important
part of achieving a settlement, such events receive a weight
of .25. Actual meetings are assumed to indicate somewhat
more progress than mere offers, though since sincerity may
still be lacking, the number of events of settlement talks
is multiplied by .5. The weights are multiplied by the
number of events of their respective factors. The three
totals of the weighted factors are then added together to
create the dependent variable, known as "Progress Toward a
Negotiated Settlement." Because the time periods vary in
length, they had to be adjusted. Each raw total is then
divided by the number of months in the period to create an
adjusted dependent variable (DV) score, shown in Table 5.3.
The study also considers whether changes in the factors
believed necessary to achieve a settlement are a direct
result of a change in counterinsurgency or whether they are
due to events totally unaffected by, or exogenous to, a
change in strategy. Most of the changes in the settlement
factors and indicators are apparently due to a combination
118
of effects, from both the changed strategy as well from
exogenous effects not directly attributed to a change in
strategy. For example, a reduction in Soviet assistance to
the FMLN due to severe economic problems, or a change of
leadership in the United States are exogenous variables, not
directly affected by a change in the dominant
counterinsurgency strategy used in the Salvadoran conflict.
This method has problems of control and of relating
cause and effct, due to the difficulty of isolating events
to ensure that the changes in the factors were actually due
to the changes in strategies. Many of the factors may be
affected by forces other than components of the
counterinsurgency strategies. Where these exogenous forces
are apparent, I will mention them and try to assess their
effects -- wnether they reinforce or contradict the actual
strategies. Despite these limitations, this type of
analysis is still a useful tool for assessing the ability of
the differing counterinsurgency strategies for inducing or
discouraging the achievement of a negotiated political
settlement and to gauge progress toward that goal by
examining changes in the indicators related to each factor.
Another problem is the availability of data on each of the
phenemenon. Insurgency by its nature is a secret affair,
security needs being paramount for insurgents' survival.
Thus, obtaining any information at all on insurgent numbers,
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strategy, sympathizers, unity and external support, etc., is
generally difficult, and what information that is obtained
is generally classified. The reliability of the data
received is also often difficult to assess. When looking at
characteristics of the factions it is necessary to remember
that different strategies can occur in different regions
simulteneously, and that various factions within a side may
have differing preferences and actions. This study chooses
what are apparently the dominant strategies and positions of
each period.
Anothei difficulty is with dividing the time periods,
due to the nature of strategy in general. How can a change
in strategy be pinpointed? Strategy changes are generally
not announced (policy changes often are), or may be
announced long before or even after implemented -- or not
actually implemented at all. At times, leadership may
recognize that it has de facto changed its strategy after
noticing that over time its accumulated policy changes
reflect this. Using declarative policy statements is
inadequate because actual policies as well as the sincerity
and focus of their implementation may differ markedly from
advertised policy -- and often do. I attempt to divide a
period into a new strategy on the basis of a combination of
statements, policy changes, and changed emphasis.
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roughly identifying a point where a change in strategy has
occurred. A strategy does not change overnight -- it is
implemented gradually, and may or may not evolve purposely.
B. BACKGROUND SUMMARY
In El Salvador in 1979, regional developments converged
with various changes ongoing in the country to produce the
backdrop for widespread insurgency.
Pressure came from several sources: economic crisis
fed by a global recession and a sharp drop in world
coffee prices; popular disenchantment with the landed
oligarchy; a growing and discontented middle class; a
clamorous Left inspired by Marxism-Leninism and
liberation theology; and the ineptitude and harshness
of successive military governments. 108
In the 1970s, widespread demands for political participation
and social reform increased. Electoral fraud in 1972, when
the Army interfered with an electoral victory by a center-
left coalition led by Jose Napoleon Duarte, prompted a cycle
of repression which diminished the legitimacy of the regime
and pushed much of the opposition to join Marxist groups.
The revolutionary victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in
their successful overthrow of the Somoza government in July
1979 gave the Salvadoran people an example, and increased
the fear of the Salvadoran military and government as well
as the United States. A group of reformist army officers
staged a coup in October 1979 hoping 4o prevent a repeat of
108Bacevich, et al: 3.
125
Nicaragua. "The coup launched just enough reform to provoke
the oligarchy and its rightist allies in the army into
death-squad violence, while failing to satisfy militant
popular movements."10 9 Popular demands for reform and
human rights improvements, expressed in massive
demonstrations and strikes, were suppressed brutally by
armed forces. Some members of the civilian-military junta
formed in 1979 attempted to limit the violence but found
that in practice the armed forces still exercised unchecked
authority.
Various guerrilla groups began forming in rural areas,
each with the goal of overthrowing the existing political
system as well as modifying the economic structure and
social order. In 1980, as government repression became more
widespread and indiscriminate and even the most moderate
reforms were blocked, various radical and moderate groups
set aside their mutual differences to form a political
opposition coalition, the Revolutionary Democratic Front
(FDR). Guillermo Ungo, a moderate member of the junta,
resigned in January 1980, and later that year became head of
the FDR. In October 1980 a loose alliance also formed of
the five major guerrilla groups, creating the FMLN, with an
'"°Lane, Charles: p. 23.
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estimated 12,000 active insurgents. 0 The FDR became
politically aligned with the FMLN.
The FMLN is managed by the Unified Revolutionary
Directorate, a 15-member war council of guerrilla groups.
The groups and commanders are as follows:
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) 
- Joaquin Villalobos
Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) 
- Leonel
Gonzalez/Salvador Cayetano Carpio
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) 
- Ferman
Cienfuegos
Armed Forces of Liberation/Salvador Communist Party 
-
Shafik Jorge Handal
Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRTC) 
-
Roberto Roca
While the more radical guerrilla-oriented movements are also
represented in the FDR diplomatic political commission,
which makes policy for the front, the FDR is generally
moderate. Villalobos is the dominant leader on the Unified
Revolutionary Directorate. He heads the ERP, the largest,
most radical and doctrinaire guerrilla movement. Shafik
Handal of the PCES also carries considerable weight in the
FMLN councils because of his close ties with the USSR and
the international communist movement, despite the relatively
small size of the PCES. They have been generally less
"
0Bacevich, et al: 4.
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flexible on resolving the conflict through negotiations than
the FDR.
The two major political parties in El Salvador are the
centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the hardline
rightist National Republican Party (ARENA).
Debate has raged for the past decade in the US over the
amount of arms and equipment the FMLN possesses and from
whom it is supplied. The US administration has claimed that
the FMLN is supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
Nicaragua, as well as by other socialist countries. While
there is some evidence at the unclassified level of this
support, the author did not find open source data which
provided specific estimates of the extent and types of this
assistance, how it has varied over the last ten years, nor
how dependent the FMLN is on external assistance.
With a population of 5 million, El Salvador has an
economy dependent on commodity exports; a badly skewed
distribution of land and wealth; a traditionally
authoritarian government with widespread official corruption
and repression of popular institutions, and a military
establishment which continues to value itself as the final
arbiter of political power. Most of the agricultural land
is used to cultivate non-food products for export, the
benefits of which are not received by a majority of the
peasants.
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US security interests in Central America derive partly
from the region's close geographic pro; mity to the US, its
strategic location astride vital shippLng lanes, and its raw
material resources, as reflected by this speech of President
Reagan to Congress on April 27, 1983:
...nearness on the map does not even begin to tell the
strategic importance of Central America, bordering as
it does on the Caribbean -- our lifeline to the outside
world. 2/3 of all our foreign trade and petroleum pass
through the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. In a
European crisis, at least 1/2 of our supplies for NATO
would go through these areas at sea. '
US policy in El Salvador since 1981 represents a US
approach to provide an ally with weapons, ammunition and
other equipment, economic aid, intelligence support,
strategy advice, and tactical training, in an effort to
defeat an insurgency without committing US troops to combat.
Congress placed restrictions on the number of US troops in
El Salvador, and placed limits on their activities, such as
not participating in combat.
Another type of aid which the United States provides as
part of their counterinsurgency effort is known as
"pacification" assistance. 'Pacification' refers to the use
of non-lethal resources and techniques to reduce popular
support for leftist insurgents and to achieve tighter
""'Central America: Defending Our Vital Interests," in
Realism, Strength, Negotiations: Key Foreign Policy
Statements of the Reagan Administration Washington, DC: US
Department of State, 1984, p. 130.
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control over the rural population. Pacification projects
include agrarian reform, civic action programs, food
distribution, rural reconstruction, and refugee programs.
Two elements of political stabilization include pacification
and democratization. The latter is intended by the US
"...to strengthen those basic institutions fundamental to
the democratic process.. " such as the judicial system,
security forces, US-associated labor unions, and the
electoral system.
Goals of the US in supporting counterinsurgency efforts
in El Salvador, according to a statement by the Reagan
administration in their presentation to Congress for
requested security assistance, are as follows:
...US policy interests in El Salvador are to advance
the causc- of democracy; improve economic conditions;
promote peaceful change; strengthen hemispheric
cooperation; prevent hostile anti-democratic forces
from gaining a strategic foothold; and to prevent the
Soviet Union from increasing its influence in the
region."'
From 1980-89 the US spent over $4.5 billion on El
Salvador. US funds constitute almost half of El Salvador's
import bill and about one-third of the total government
operating expenses. After over ten years the prolonged
struggle has not led to the collapse of the government and
its armed forces. However, the substantial US backing has
2US Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance
Programs, FY86: p. 172.
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not led to the decisive defeat of the insurgents. In the
words of one analyst, "All that money has not yet bought
success for US policy. ' 113
Many argue that a political settlement is not possible.
The history of the region, its geopolitical setting, the
socio-economic structure, and/or the unbending ideology of
the revolutionary insurgents are presented as insuperable
obstacles to peaceful compromise."4
C. PERIOD 1 (1980)
After some initial hesitation, as the FMLN became
increasingly powerful and successful, the Carter
administration began to provide a relatively low amount of
economic and "non-lethal" military assistance to the
Salvadoran ccvernment and military. The Carter strategy was
to provide a limited amount of military and economic means
to prevent the overthrow of the Salvadoran government. The
Carter administration insisted that some reform accompany
the increased assistance, and insisted on a "...clean anti-
subversive war. '1n 5  Some limited reforms did occur. "The




5Arnson, Cynthia, "The Salvadoran Military and Regime
Transformation," in Grabendorff: 122.
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partnership with its despised enemy, the Christian
Democratic party, to promulgate land reform, and to appoint
Duarte as president of the ruling junta." 116 The United
States suspended further economic and military aid on
December 5, 1980, pending an investigation of the deaths of
four US churchworkers, apparently carried out by right wing/
government forces. In response to the aid cutoff, the junta
reorganized, appointing Duarte as president in hopes of
gaining enough credibility to renew aid. On December 17,
the United States resumed $20 million in economic aid to El
Salvador, but not military assistance. On January 14, 1981,
Carter resumed military aid due to reports that the FMLN was
receiving increased supplies of arms from outside the
country and now posed a threat to the Salvadoran government.
On the same day the FMLN expressed a desire to open direct
negotiations with the United States for a ceasefire and a
political settlement. The United States refused, and on
January 16 Carter approved an additional $5 million in
"combat" aid.
There were no significant settlement offers by either
side during this period, although the reasons for the US to
decline the FMLN offer are unclear. As table 5.1 shows, few
conditions at this time favored an agreement. The FMLN
116Karl, in Hamilton, et al: 175.
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thought that victory was imminent, and so was unwilling to
negotiate on US/Salvadoran terms. However, the Salvadoran
government and military expected imminent US support, and
were adamant about pursuing a victory as well. There was
only one settlement offer by the FMLN, and no offers or
acceptances by the Salvadoran government, and thus no
settlement meetings took place, and no conditions expressed
from which flexibility could be measured, the adjusted DV
score for this period equals 0.2 (see Table 5.3).
D. PERIOD 2 (1981-MID-1983)
The election of Reagan in November 1980 led to a change
in US policy favored by the right (in both the United States
and El Salvador) and much of the Salvadoran military.
Expecting massive military aid for the Salvadoran
government and armed forces once Reagan was inaugarated, the
FMLN launched a hoped-for 'final offensive' in January 1981.
Government success in surviving the offensive was followed
by brutal repression by government forces and 'death
squads.'
The initial counterinsurgency strategy by the Reagan
administration was to win a military victory. In 1981 a
guerrilla victory seemed likely. The FMLN was using quasi-
conventional tactics and was highly successful in their
campaigns. Initial US support was aimed at preventing the
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collapse of the Salvadoran government and forces. The
United States sponsored a massive expansion of the
Salvadoran armed forces. The State Department specified
that US military aid to El Salvador would not be linked to
political reforms or human rights abuses.
US support in this period concentrated on training
units, providing materiel, strategic advice and intelligence
support. The Reagan administration tolerated the campaign
of provocation and intimidation by the far right in El
Salvador, due to fears of 'another Nicaragua,' and vowed "to
draw the line against communism." "Reagan directly
repudiated the Carter human rights policy and seemed to
promise military aid without restraints."'17 Hardliners in
the White House and CIA talked of "winning the war first,
then building a democracy." They ignored or made excuses
for the human rights abuses by the security forces and death
squads, tacitly accepting them as lesser evils. Repression
and indiscriminate killings "played into the hands of the
left." Much of the remaining moderate opposition was driven
to become aligned with the insurgents (a disloyal
opposition).
In the fall of 1981, the Report of the El Salvador
Military Strategy Assistance Team -- jointly drafted by
17Brown: 118.
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Salvadoran and American officers -- outlined a plan to
expand, equip, and retrain the Salvadoran Armed Forces (SAF)
into a force able to successfully combat the FMLN. Commonly
known as the Woerner Report, this document represented the
initial TJS cornter4 nsurc-enc-7 etrateyy in El Salvador. US
support concentrated on providing materiel; training units;
expanding the force structure; prescribing more relevant
tactics; upgrading command, control, communications, and
intelligence; establishing a logistics system; and
modernizing and expanding the Salvadoran Air Force
(FAS) .n e US strategists did not seriously consider an
active combat role in El Salvador for US forces, and wary cf
perceived mistakes made in Vietnam, were determined not to
'gringoize' the conflict.
Unfortunately, the team's members had neither the time,
the expertise, nor even the charter to examine with
equal thoroughness the other facets of counterinsurgent
strategy: population control, social and economic
reforms, the reinforcement of democratic institutions,
improvement of government services, civic action, civil
defense, or psychological operations (PSYOPs). As a
result, the report dealt with these issues in passing
or not at all. 19
In January 1981 there were over 2500 deaths of civilian
noncombatants by the armed forces and death squads,
including seven Americans, leading to increased US
118Bacevich, et al: 5, 21.
"
9Bacevich, et al: 21.
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congressional and public concern over human rights abuses in
El Salvador.120 The US administration would not
acknowledge the direct responsibility of the Salvadoran
government and military for the killings and tried to
attribute them to the "extreme right" and even the extreme
left, despite overwhelming evidence indicating
otherwise.121 According to international human rights
organizations and the Church, abuses attributed to the
guerrillas were proportionately much lower than those
attributed to the armed forces. US policy was marked by
tension between those who emphasized military
counterinsurgency and those who argued for reform and a
democratic opening.122 Condemnation of US backing for the
Salvadoran regime increased, both internationally and
domestically.
In response to rising public concern over the
Salvadoran military's involvement in death squad
activity and the increasing potential for direct US
intervention, the Congress began to restrict the
administration's policy of seeking military victory by
tying foreign aid legislation to a presidential
'
2 Brown: 118.
"'Cooperation between the death squads and the security
forces is further evidenced by the ability of the death squads
to get through vehicle checks and operate during curfews.
Uniformed forces have been known to block streets to permit
the squads to carry out operations. No arrest or prosecution
for death squad activities has occurred. Brown: 118.
'Lane: 23.
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certification of the curtailment of human rights abuses
and the promotion of socioeconomic reform.123
Congressional legislation required the president to
certify compliance with certain human rights conditions
within thirty days to continue US military aid to El
Salvador, and further rprtifications every 1?0 day3 to
continue military aid. Congress tried to force the
administration to tie aid to human rights improvement.
Despite evidence of abuses, beginning in January 1982,
President Reagan certified four times that the required
conditions had been met. Congress imposed a 55-man limit on
the number of US trainers and advisors in El Salvador
(although in practice the US military presence exceeded that
number: by late 1984 there were over 100 US military
personnel in El Salvador, and over 150 by 1987) .124 How
the administration was able to violate this limit for so
long is unclear.
Throughout 1981 the FMLN held the initiative and
operated freely in many parts of the country. The SAF grew
during this time at a greater rate than the FMLN, and by the
end of the year the military was beginning to hold its own.
"Attempts to address root causes during this period enjoyed
.
23Karl, Terry, in Hamilton: 175.
124Bacevich, et al: 5.
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less success than did efforts to stabilize the military
situation. ,125
In 1981 the FDR/FMLN came out in favor of negotiations
to end the war, an initiative tentatively supported by
Duarte and the Christian Democrats. ...Mexico began a
series of diplomatic activities calling for
negotiations, which ultimately culminated in the
Contadora peace initiative in 1983. The Reagan
q _ i.q-- A'. persistent refusal to support such a
dialogue soon became a major obstacle to mediation
efforts between the Duarte government and the FDR-FMLN,
and diplomatically isolated the United States. 126
On September 29, 131, in an address to the United Nations'
General Assembly, President Duarte called for the FMLN to
lay down their arms and negotiate a political ae'tlement.
However, he ruled out direct talks with the FMLN.
The 1982 elections were intended to choose the Salvadoran
Constituent Assembly, whi-h would write a new constitution
and choose an interim president to govern until new
elections, to be held in 1983 or 1984. The left claimed it
was unable to participate in the election due to fear of
initimidation by the Right. 27 The government had placed
restrictions on campaigning and eliminated opposition
newspapers. The elections did not produce the results US
policymakers had hoped for -- instead of a victory by the
12Bacevich, et al: 6.




centrist PDC, the ARENA coalition was able to build a
majority coalition. The United States was obliged to
pressure the military to prevent an ARENA candidate from
assuming office. This deprived the US administration of
much of the opportunity it sought to gain from the election
through increasing the legitimacy of the Salvadoran
government. The administration recognized that this was
needed to persuade Congress to continue approving aid. The
US pressured the military to appoint a moderate, Alvarado
Magana. The military, fazed with possible cutoff or
reduction of aid, complied. However, the 1982 elections had
little effect on the exercise of power in El Salvador as the
armed forces continued to dominate policy. Human rights
abuses continued at a high level, especially targeted
against the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the FDR.
In January 1982 the commanders of the FMLN asked the United
States to accept a negotiated settlement without
preconditions by any of the parties to the conflict. In
February 1982, Ruben Zamora, general secretary of the FDR,
said that he and other exiled opposition leaders would
return to El Salvador "to work for a political settlement"
if the government guaranteed access to the press, reopened
the National University, provided amnesty for approximately
500 political prisoners, and revoked legal strictures on
labor union activity. The United States rejected the offer
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and continued to resist such requests until a round of talks
at the US State Department occurred in December 1982 which
included two FDR leaders, Zamora and Altschuld. No
significant agreement was produced. "Despite the temporary
success of the 1982 elections in dividing the Left, pressure
to support a negotiated settlement in El Salvador increased
in the US, particularly because the alternative seemed to be
the domestically unpopular prospect of direct military
involvement.' 12 Congress began to withhold funds from El
Salvador, cutting $60 million in aid requested by the
administration in half to protest the lack of progress in
the investigations of the deaths of four churchwomen and
other US citizens. Congress suspended aid in May 1982 when
it determined that progress on land reform had ceased. In
July 1982, however, the Reagan administration declared that
El Salvador had met the required conditions so that aid
could be resumed. In August 1982, the US Embassy and the
Roman Catholic Church reported that since the US
administration's assertion of human rights progress in July
1982 there had been a large increase in political killings.
In late 1982 and early 1983 a series of FMLN offensives led
to an urgent appeal to Congress from the Reagan
administration for increased military aid to El Salvador.
"
28Karl, Terry, in Hamilton: 179.
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In early 1983 the FMLN regrouped and successfully
struck and briefly controlled new areas of the country.
They controlled large tracts of Chalatenango and Morazan
provinces, and were fielding a reinforced brigade supported
with captured armored vehicles and artillery and engaging
the army in conventional set-piece battles.
By September 1983 the FMLN had extended control to
about one-third of the Salvadoran territory and had
seriously disrupted the economic base. In late 1983 and
early 1984 the FMLN mounted spectacular assaults, pointing
out the underlying weaknesses of the regime and the
military. In 1983, the US State Department, under Thonmas
Enders, initiated a dual-track US policy of pursuing
negotiations while continuing counterinsurgency support to
the Salvadordn government.'29 However, this continued only
until shortly after President Reagan was re-elected. The
negotiations were scrapped and Enders left his position.
Generally poor leadership and low morale plagued the
SAF, indicating to the US that the guerrillas were not going
to be defeated as easily as the Reagan administration had






The State Department argued that the death squads were
increasing recruits for the FMLN and making it difficult to
get military aid sponsored by Capitol Hill. Pragmatists in
the administration "...insisted that defeating the rebels
depended on a legitimate political order based on elections,
social reform, and respect for human rights.
1 3
During this period, as seen in Table 5.2, some factors
favored a settlement being reached. Domestic pressure in
the United States and international pressure for a
settlement were both very high, and that in El Salvador was
moderate. The US government released statements that the
amount of Soviet support to the FMLN had apparently been
reduced somewhat in 1982, although the US administration did
not stress this development in its appeals for aid. Popular
support for the government was low, suggesting that if that
was a big concern of the regime they would approach a
settlement as a means to increase its legitimacy. The FMLN
also had the upper hand militarily, enjoying the most
successes in this period and even using semi-conventional
warfare methods. Both the Salvadoran government and the
significant external supporters of both sides, the USSR and
the US, experienced changes in leadership. However, the
dominant strategies favcred by the new leaders of both the
131Lane: 24.
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US and El Salvador discouraged an agreement instead of
providing a new opportunity for compromise. The Salvadoran
military, and therefore the government as well, given the
power of the military over the government, still pursued a
strategy of pursuing military victory. Because the US
administration also favored a military victory by the
Salvadoran government to resolve the conflict, it did not
use the leverage provided by Salvadoran dependence to
influence a settlement. The level of conflict was
escalating, indicated by the large increase in US military
support, the estimated casualty rates of each side, the
number of offensives and "spectaculars," and the number of
human rights abuses in this period. Negotiation offers by
each side occurred during this period, but the lack of
flexibility in settlement conditions by the Salvadoran and
US governments and the low level of flexibility by the FMLN
show that neither side was sincerely pursuing an actual
negotiated settlement. The amount of assistance the FMLN
received from external supporters and how dependent they
were on this support is unclear. The reasons for the
apparent decline in external assistance from the Soviets in
1982 and whether this decline was expected to continue are
also unknown to the author. The amount and types of weapons
and platforms the FMLN apparently possessed compared to the
extent and scope of the support provided by the United
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States suggest that the external support to each side was
not balanced. Mediation offers by the Social Democrat
parties of Latin America were not acted upon, and thus did
not indicate much progress toward reaching an agreement.
The adjusted DV score of 0.125 for Period Two indicates
marginal progress over Period One.
E. PERIOD 3 (MID-1983 - MID-1984)
In 1983 a series of major FMLN strikes jolted US
policymakers into initiating a more 'sophisticated'
counterinsurgency strategy, leading to several major changes
which took effect by mid-1983. The Reagan administration
began to increasingly recognize the importance of
establishing a government that could direct the political as
well as the imilitary side of the counterinsurgency effort.
US policymaker3 believed that a PDC government would help
factionalize the FMLN alliance and weaken its efforts,
politically isolate the insurgent-s, and give domestic and
international credence to administration claims that El
Salvador was a fragile democracy needing and deserving US
military and economic support.
The adminstration formed the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America, headed by Henry Kissinger, to
find a more politically salable and effective policy
formula. The Commission recommended billions of dollars of
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economic assistance as part of a program of 'human
development,' and making military aid conditional on an end
to official murders and punishment of past human rights
offenders.132
US Vice-President Bush went to El Salvador in December
1983 to inform the military high command that high-level
tolerance of death squads was over, and to demand a purge of
the army's worst offenders. Bush requested the arrest,
exile, or retirement of military officers suspected of
complicity in death squad activity, and the trial of
soldiers implicated in the 1980 murder of US churchwomen in
return for a substantial increase in military assistance to
the SAF in quantities sufficient to reduce the guerrilla
insurgency to manageable proportions. He warned the
military against overthrowing the civilian government, and
threatened to terminate all assistance if the SAF interfered
with the elections or failed to respect their outcome. Such
pressure from a high-level source was apparently a credible
threat -- at least temporarily. Some suspected death squad
leaders were removed from their positions (but not punished
or retired). Death squad activity declined sharply: from
May-October 1983 there were 588 killings and 322
disappearances; from November 1983-April 1984 there were a
132Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America
145
reported 241 deaths and 113 disappearances, showing a
significant improvement after increased US pressure.
A meeting took place in July 1983 between the US
Special Envoy to Central America, Richard Stone, and Ruben
Zamora. Preparations were made for a meeting "with an open
agenda" between the FDR-FMLN and US representatives. In
December 1983, Ruben Zamora and other FDR-FMLN members met
with US State Department officials. However, nothing
significant emerged from these meetings. US military
support continued at a high rate during the talks.
A new constitution was drafted in 1983-84 and basic
rules for political participation were laid down. US
policymakers hoped that the elections would undercut the
appeal of the insurgents. They believed that because the
FMLN sensed imminent military victory as well as feared the
death squads, the left would not participate in the
elections, thereby increasing chances of a PDC win.
One of the FMLN responses to the increased US military
assistance and the Salvadoran military buildup was to
initiate negotiations. In February 1984 they proposed a
"government of broad participation," in which the guerrilla
forces would be incorporated into the Salvadoran army.
Duarte demanded the rebels join "the democratic process" and
insisted that he would not yield on a power-sharing
arrangement.
146
The election of Duarte in March 1984 was crucial for
continuing US military and economic aid to be approved by
Congress. Political gains through the US perception of the
Duarte administration made it easier for the administration
to underwrite the Salvadoran counterinsurgency effort. The
improvement in political and human rights noted by the
Salvadoran Roman Catholic Church, international
organizations, and foreign governments improved the
international image of the Salvadoran government. The
administration's "pragmatic tilt" induced Congress to
respond with over $200 million in military aid to El
Salvador in 1984 following the election of Duarte. The leap
in US funding transformed the character of the war.
The elections were also a blow to FMLN-FDR cohesion.
Internal divisions increased over their response. The
apparent alternative offered by the elections increased the
potential for factionalism. However, this rift was only
temporary.
Other changes occurred in the US approach to
counterinsurgency.
American officers recognized... that victory required
first redressing the grievances of the Salvadoran
people. Behind a shield of security provided by ESAF,
the government had to transform itself into an
institution perceived as effective, impartial, and
committed to bringing about genuine reform.133
133Bacevich, et al: 6.
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However, understanding alone did not produce effective
approaches to the integration of military activities,
including security operations, civil defense, civic action,
and PSYOPs into a coherent program of social and economic
reform, known as the "other war.,134
In the early years of US support, its counterinsurgency
efforts had the greatest impact in areas where the US
military is most comfortable: increasing mobility and
firepower, providing intelligence through highly
sophisticated means, and constructing fixed-site facilities.
As a result of US training and weaponry, and "the willful
rejection of counterinsurgency in the 1970s" by the US
military and planners,
... structurally, (the SAF) emerged as a force better
suited for conventional war than for counterinsurgency.
... tactical air support, heavy weapons and battalion-
size operations helped ESAF turn the tide in the war's
early, desperate phase. Once the conflict reverted to
a true insurgency, however, ESAF's unsuitability for
the 'other war' became apparent. Subsequent attempts
to wean ESAF from the conventional bias... met stubborn
Salvadoran resistance."'
US security assistance allowed the SAF to purchase heavy
weapons of little utility in counterinsurgency, and to
develop capabilities which are irrelevant or even
134Bacevich, et al.: v.
135Bacevich, et al: vii.
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counterproductive.136 The Salvadoran troops which had been
trained as elite 'hunter battalions' were generally
unwilling to adopt the small-scale 'search and destroy'
tactics the US advisors recommended as key to defeating the
guerrillas without devastating the country's noncombatant
population.
The 'National Plan of Security and Development,'
created in June 1983 by a group of US policy analysts,
... represented a commendable if belated attempt to
formulate a comprehensive counterinsurgent strategy.
... (the Plan) prescribed a method for incorporating
(the SAF's) efforts into an expanding panapoly of
capabilities all intended to earn popular support for
the Salvadoran government. The Woerner Report had
aimed to create an army that could kill guerrillas; the
aim of the (Plan) was to win. 137
The National Plan included:
1) groun sweeps through conflicted areas to
remove guerrillas;
2) securing the area by establishing civilian
defense patrols;
3) initiation of development and reconstruction
programs by civilian pacification agencies; and
4) resettlement of reconstructed villages with
internal refugees.
The National Plan represented the first ambitious effort by
the US and Salvadoran governments to move from 'chasing
guerrillas' to winning popular support. The Plan was
136Bacevich, et al: 29-33.
137Bacevich, et al: 21.
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intended to create 'rural security' by driving guerrillas
out of conflict zones, form civil defense patrols to
maintain security in these zones, then use welfare and
humanitarian assistance programs, superficial development
projects, and psychological operations (PSYOPs) to build
support for and control by the government and to reduce the
appeal of and access to the insurgents.
The initial implementation of the National Plan, in the
department of San Vicente, was known as 'Operation Well-
being,' followed in Usulutan in fall 1983. The plan failed,
largely due to lack of funding, the SAF's inability to
provide security for proposed resettlement sites, and the
unavailability of sufficient land for proposed agricultural
development schemes. The SAF also was not committed to
forming the civil defense patrols. The military tended to
distrust the villagers who were to form the patrols, so they
were poorly organized, often unarmed, and poorly trained.
As a consequence, the SAF needed more batallions to maintain
a shield of the development area while continuing to conduct
necessary operations elsewhere, and needed forces better
tailored for the 'other war.'
During this period, Table 5.1 shows that more
conditions favored a settlement than at any previous time.
However, US military aid jumped markedly, limiting the
extent of actual government reforms and making the military
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even less willing to make concessions to terminate the
conflict. The ratio of US economic to military assistance
declined during this period, indicating greater attention to
the military solution despite the reforms proposed earlier
by Duarte. US economic resources allocated to the National
Plan during this period acted more as a stop-gap to produce
stabilization than to actually achieve restructuring and
development needed to implement the plan. The adjusted DV
score of 0.166 for this period (see Table 5.3) shows that
significant progress toward achieving a negotiated
settlement was made during the early Duarte administration.
A compariscn of Period Two with Period Three indicates that
the improvement was apparently due primarily to the change
in the US counterinsurgency strategy and the subsequent
changes in the strategies of the Salvadoran government and
military.
F. PERIOD 4 (1984-1985)
The failure of Operation Well-Being impeded subsequent
efforts to implement the National Plan. Disappointment with
the outcome convinced hard-core SAF commanders "...to forget
about 'hearts and minds' in favor of pursuing
guerrillas.' 3 8 After this failure, the National Plan
languished until 1986.
138Bacevich, et al: 44
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By 1984 US policies no longer faced major opposition
from western Europe, due to what the Europeans perceived as
a change in emphasis of the US counterinsurgency effort,
resulting from the Duarte administration and significant
reduction in human rights abuses. The European allies were
still concerned with the threat of the US starting a
regional war in Central America, and did little to support
US efforts. As a result of the changes in the early period
of Duarte's presidency, congressional support for the Reagan
administration's El Salvador policy increased and
international support for the FMLN was reduced.
The Duarte regime, with US backing, did some
restructuring of the security forces and transferred some of
the leading rightist officers outside the country. However,
Duarte was discouraged from taking actions against economic
elites, and the pending land reform was dismantled. Much of
the substanciai reformist goals were dropped. The US backed
away from many reforms called for in the Kissinger
Commission report, and began to push austerity measures
making it difficult for Duarte to fulfill the "social pact"
to benefit workers and peasants which he had promised. The
US downplayed land reform and directed funding into projects
promoting agro-industrialization. The United States spent
hundreds of millions of dollars on benefitting economic
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elites in the Salvadoran private sector who were unwilling
to risk their own wealth in their own country.'"
By 1984, over 50,000 Salvadorans had died and 27% of
the population had been displaced. Almost 80% of the
population was unemployed or underemployed.140 According
to a poll in 1983, 51.4% of the Salvadoran population
supported dialogue with the FDR-FMLN, and 10.3% favored
annihilating the FDR-FMLN through a military victory.
However, the Duarte administration was "...at the mercy of a
US-backed military establishment that viewed negotiations as
weakness in the face of Soviet-inspired communism and
pressured the government to preside over a military
solution...""'i' The military effectively prevented Duarte
from negotiating an end to the civil war, the formation of a
new government, or the integration of the military with the
insurgent armed forces. The Salvadoran elites renewed their
pressures against a negotiated settlement and for a military
victory. US military involvement increased again. The
administration urged Congress to double military assistance,
increase its training of Salvadoran troops, and increase the
number of US advisers. The US helped create and train more
139Lane: 24.
140Karl, in Hamilton: 182.
14'Karl, in Hamilton: 182.
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effective central command and control procedures and several
elite "hunter" battalions."2
The FMLN could not match the government forces' massive
buildup in manpower and equipment in late 1983. Through the
early months of 1984 the FMLN continued to hold the upper
hand in the conflict, holding approximately 60
municipalities. They were able to launch offensives of 500-
600 troops. Later in 1984 the FMLN appeared to decline:
they launched fewer offensives, and while previously they
had been able to supply their estimated 10,000 member force
through voluntary enlistments, they, like the government,
began a policy of drafting or impressments.'" The FMLN
adjusted their strategy. They reverted to emphasizing hit
and run tactics and other guerrilla warfare methods,
including a sustained campaign of sabotage against economic
targets.144 "Unable to compete either in terms of manpower
or firepower, the guerrillas tried to avoid set-piece
battles. ,,145
US support led to a large-scale buildup in the number
and types of aircraft in the SAF's inventory. The annual
142However, the SAF often resisted using the small-unit





number of Salvadoran air strikes increased from 111 in 1982
to 1,081 in 1985. A new heavy bombing campaign was
initiated in 1984. US aircraft began providing the SAF with
information on guerrilla movements, so the SAF could bomb
guerrilla positions. This led to increased civilian
casualties, but reduced the FMLN's ability to move large
units against large objectives and restricted their
mobility. Although in 1984 the majority of civilian,
noncombatant deaths were due to military operations, the US
administration claimed publicly that they were due mostly to
death squads. In any war, some civilians taking no part in
hostilities may suffer as an inevitable consequence of
attacks on legitimate military targets. However, in El
Salvador, attacks by the military on noncombatants who lived
in guerrilla-controlled or conflict zones, known as "masas",
were often deliberate. Such attacks were intended to
deprive the guerrillas of a population to obtain sustenance,
having the effect of creating a large population of external
refugees and internally displaced persons. The apparent
need to minimize noncombatant casualties to gain and
maintain the support of the civilian population led the
government to reduce its use of indiscriminate bombing by
1986, although the air war continued.
The air strikes did not significantly affect the morale
or fighting potential of the FMLN, but killed and displaced
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thousands of civilians.146 The government sweeps through
rebel-occupied territory were largely ineffective because
the FMLN simply moved out of the way. However, government
forces at least partially reduced the FMLN's ability to
achieve the large-scale successes which were common in 1983.
The military's tactical operations and intelligence-
gathering capabilities improved, forcing the FMLN to move in
units of a dozen or less.
US aid prevented the overthrow of the government, but
also inhibited a compromise from occurring.
The Reagan administration/Salvadoran government and the
opposition can thus veto each other's preferred
outcomes and produce a protracted war rather than the
necessary basic agreement on such fundamantel issues as
the share of power to be exercised by the opposition,
the extent of socioeconomic reform..., the fate of the
contending armies, and accountability for past
terrorist -,tivities.""
Duarte understood that the military and the Reag_.
administration, the two leading forces historically opposed
to negotiations, needed him to maintain US aid. This
realization motivated Duarte to propose negotiations with
the FMLN in October 1984. Duarte hoped to shift the focus
from military action to political negotiations.
Duarte did not seek US permission for his negotiation




"Karl, in Hamilton: 187.
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commanders to discuss the incorporation of the insurgents
"into the process of democratization, and the preparations
in an atmosphere of freedom for the next popular
election. '148 The Reagan administration was surprised by
Duarte's offer, but supported it in later statements. On
Duarte's initiative, preliminary talks began in October 1984
in La Palma, a village approximately 50 miles from San
Salvador.149 They were attei led by President Duarte, the
Defense Minister, General Vides Casanova (at the FMLN's
request), and four FMLN-FDR representatives, including Ungo
and Zamora. Salvadoran Archbishop Rivera y Damas media-..ed
and the two sides met in a church.
Duarte offered amnesty to the guerrillas who agreed to
lay down their arms and join the derocratic process. He
said they would have a chance to compete in municipal and
legislative elections in March 1985. Duarte did not mention
the reorganization of the Salvadozin army the insurgents had
long demanded. The meeting produced mainly promises to meet
again. The FMLN wanted a share of power in the government
14Time October 22, 1984 "Appointment in La Palma," p. 53.
149Ferman Cienfuegos, commander of a FMLN faction involved
in a rivalry with Villalobos, was at the time more willing to
negotiate an end to the war than was Villalobos' faction. La
Palma was in an area cominated by the faction at odds with
Villalobos. Some analysts speculate that Duarte deliberately
chose this location as part of a strategy of divide and
conquer.
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prior to elections. They claimed that death squads would
slaughter them if they laid down their arms. Ungo and
Zamora hinted that the FMLN might be flexible about their
demand for a coalition government. "Duarte yielded nothing
on the most important issues: the rebel demands for a share
of government power prior to any elections, and for the
integration of guerrilla units into the Salvadoran armed
forces.'150 The army refused to accept a merger with the
guerrillas. The meeting produced mainly promises to meet
again.
Talks resumed in November 1984 in Ayagualo, a village
12 miles from San Salvador. The FMLN called for a three-
stage plan, which involved reforming the constitution,
holding new general elections, and reorganizing the armed
forces. "Duarte rejected the proposal as unworkable under
El Salvador's constitution."'5' Duarte's government
offered the FMLN a place on the ballot if they would lay
down arms and play by new political rules. FMLN leadership
believed it would mean their physical and political death to
do so, and rejected Duarte's proposal that they disarm and
take part in elections. The demands of the two sides
150"Plummeting into the Abyss," Newsweek, May 23, 1988, p.
49.
51
"Second Round: Peace Talks in a Lower Key", Time
December 10, 1984, p. 46.
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appeared to be irreconciable: the FMLN insisted on a
provisional government, in effect scrapping the new
constitution and beginning a new political process. They
insisted on holding their guns and territory until the FMLN
and government forces were integrated. The FMLN feared that
if they gave up their guns they would be massacred. The
government's position was that its legitimacy had been
ratified through three free elections and establishing a
constitution. They demanded that the guerrillas surrender
their arms and repeately urged them to participate in the
elections. The FDR countered that their candidates would be
gunned down by death squads (which were again increasing
their activity) and doubted that they would receive fair
treatment by the Central Election Council. Because they
government demonstrated almost no flexibility the two sides
were at an impasse.
ARENA denounced the talks. At the time it appeared
that the military had taken the initiative from the FMLN.
An anticipated FMLN autumn offensive had not occurred.
Conservative army officers had opposed negotiations with the
FMLN in the past, and were capable of threatening Duarte's
truce with the right. The proposal by Duarte to negotiate
antagonized the right and the military, and initially
received a negative response by the US administration. They
feared that Duarte's efforts would thwart them from
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achieving a military victory. The army was becoming more
effective, and things lately had not been going well for the
FMLN. "The Army believes it is winning the war, and some
officers might take drastic action to avoid being deprived
of their victory.'152 The military strenuously opposed the
talks held in October and November 1984. Most military
officers were convinced that, with the increased aid from
the US, they could win the war on the battlefield. Thus,
despite the constant efforts of Archbishop Rivera y Damas to
restart them, negotiations remained in limbo for most of the
year. ,153
The FMLN indicated more flexibility and sincerity to
reach a settlement at this point than did the Salvadoran
government. The Duarte regime was constrained in its
ability to compromise by the military and the US
administration. With US support and pressure, the
Salvadoran government would have been more likely to reach a
compromise. Despite a seeming impasse, if a proposal had
provided CBMs for both sides and an international commission
to provide security guarantees, the positions were not
necessarily intractable.
.
52Time, December 10, 1984, p. 49.
153Anderson: 10.
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The Reagan administration took actions that effective~y
undercut the peace process.
Besides refusing to support negotiations, the
administration encouraged an escalation of the war in
the days followli3 the La Lii taIks acid sought to
weaken the political forces calling for a dialogue.
...The Reagan administration's attitude toward dialogue
and its subsequent criticism of the Duarte government
encouraged right-wingers to renew their political
challenge.13
In 1984 the US administration moved increasingly away from
the PDC and toward a newly formed alliance of
industrialists, agro-exporters, and conservative
politicians.
The FMLN launched a major offensive after the talks,
demonstrating formidable military capabilities despite
increased US assistance to government forces. The Army
refused to ab:de by the Christmas truce agreed to by Duarte
and the rebel leaders, demonstrating the lack of civilian
control over the military. The attacks were blunted by
government forces, who in turn launched an offensive in
January 1985 to retake towns in the Chalatenango department.
Government forces successfully recovered 7 of the 26
municipalities in the province. The FMLN responded with a
new strategy. The insurgents refused to contest territory,
and moved out of the way of government forces. In 1985, the
military launched a 12,000-troop offensive into Morazan,
's4Karl, in Hamilton: 185.
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another major FMLN stronghold. Their positive results gave
the military increasing confidence that the FMLN would be
defeated by the end of the year, and the government sweeps
continued all summer.
The high command subsequently set narrow parameters on
the president's freedom to negotiate and made
compliance with these limitations a condition of its
support for the government. It ruled out any formal
ceasefire, declared that the executive had no authority
over purely military matters, and insisted that any
future settlement had to be based strictly on the 1983
Constitution, a document written mainly by the
ultraright. Without assistance from the US, the Duarte
government could do nothing to win greater flexibility
or exercise control over the military. 55
iii Jaiiuary 1985, Duarte said he would not negotiate
further with leftist guerrillas until they changed their
proposals, accusing them of not wanting a dialogue leading
to peace. Peace talks were not resumed after the late 1984
initiatives, even after the PDC successful results in the
March 1985 elections. The generally right-wing officer
corps continued to regard Duarte with suspicion. Duarte was
seen as a weak leader, unable to control the military or
bring peace. 15'6 Even after the victory of the PDC in
legislative and mayoral elections in May 1985, Duarte found
155Karl, in Hamilton: 185.
156Anderson: 9-11, 36.
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his attempts to enact social reforms and revive the stalled
land reform program frustrated at every turn. 157
Another opportunity for a negotiated settlement was
offered by the Contadora process. The Contadora countries
sought the agreement of Central American and other
interested governments on implementing specific proposals to
contain conflicts in the region. The 1984 draft treaty
sought arms control and reductions in Central American
countries; removal of all foreign military and internal
security advisors; removal and prevention of future
installation of all foreign military bases; the end of all
support of "irregular forces;" and supression of arms
traffic. The treaty also called for promotion of elections
and international democratic processes, and for
international political and economic cooperation. The
provisions of the treaty addressed every one of the stated
objectives of the United States in the region. The treaty
would have required policy changes in all Central American
countries, and the US, Cuba, and the USSR. After the draft
treaty was accepted by all Central American countries,
including Nicaragua, the Reagan administration opposed it,
claiming uncertain verification and insufficient guarantees
of Nicaraguan democracy. The United States then persuaded
...Anderson: 9.
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Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador to indicate their
disapproval and overturn their former approval. The Reagan
administration was unwilling to accept restrictions of the
treaty on US policy in Central America, and did not want to
support a treaty which would allow consolidation of the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua or require concessions in the
US administration's Salvadoran policy. Therefore the US did
not cooperate with or support the Contadora process.
Contadora had provided a workable framework, but US
policymakers did not attempt to work with the Contadora
countries to resolve the issues of verification with which
the administration claimed it was concerned.
Some US policymakers were concerned that excessive
support for the negotiated process would lead to increasing
pressures for the withdrawal option, indicated in such
statements as "...Contadora is to Central America what the
Paris Accords were to South Vietnam: a high-sounding
pretext for a walkaway.',158 Jack Child points out that the
Contadora process should have been seen and used as a
confidence-building regime with provisions for effective
verification, safeguarding the security interests of the
Central American and Latin American countries as well as of
the US.
15"Child, in Fauriol: 151.
164
By 1985 several factors were beginning to give the
Salvadoran military the upper hand in the field. The army
became increasingly adept at small-unit tactics and began
receiving better leadership from their US-trained officer
corps. The SAF "...clearly had thwarted enemy attempts to
achieve a decision through quasiconventional tactics."159
The strength of full-time members of the FMLN was assessed
to have dropped to an estimated 6,000-7,000 active
insurgents.
In response to the government's altered strategy the
FMLN mounted a broad campaign of economic sabotage. The
guerrillas retained the capability for occasional mass
attacks, but these became less frequent as the FMLN felt the
need to conserve their dwindling manpower. The FMLN began
to focus on winning political support from labor groups.
They continued their hold on large areas, often maintaining
alternate municipal governments. The FMLN turned to trying
to weaken local control, through means such as kidnapping or
killing local officials and members of the civil defense
forces, and began to concentrate on targets such as the
electric grid and transportation, with the intention of
destroying the local infrastructure.16 From 1982-1985 San




Salvador had been spared. However, in 1985 the FMLN turned
to urban terrorism in San Salvador.
As the Duarte regime's support continued to dwindle,
human rights abuses attributed to the right increased again
and chaos in political institutions became increasingly
common. By 1985, Duarte had lost much of his political
base. Duarte did not follow the reformist agenda outlined
in his campaign, due much to the pressure of the military
against the reforms as well as a lack of support for them
from the United States. While Duarte made overtures of
peace talks and even met with the FMLN, the total lack of
flexibility in the government's settlement conditions in
this period indicate that the government was not sincerely
seeking a negotiated political settlement. The Reagan
administration wanted to continue pursuing a strategy to win
" military victory, and let Duarte know it would not support
" negotiated settlement. US insistence on a predominantly
military solution reinforced the power of the SAF, which
constrained the political space of the civilian regime and
its options for reform and negotiations.
Table 5.2 shows that during this period several
conditions favored a settlement. While several meetings
occurred, no flexibility was shown by the government in its
settlement conditions. The Salvadoran military was
determined to win a military victory and the Reagan
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administration supported them in those efforts. Due to
military pressure, the Duarte government was unable to make
the reforms and concessions which were more likely to
produce an acceptaable strategy of trying to achieve a
military victory, although Congress constrained those
efforts. However, the international legitimacy provided by
the Duarte regime afforded the Reagan administration more
room to pursue such a strategy behind a screen of limited
reform, as well as the significant reduction in human rights
abuses (forced by US threats of aid cut-off). The adjusted
DV score of 0.166 for this period is equal to that of the
previous period (see Table 5.3), despite the increased
flexibility in the FMLN's conditions. This demonstrates a
lack of progress toward achieving effective conflict
termination of the Salvadoran insurgency. The most
significant factor leading to this lack of progress is
apparently the change in the counterinsurgency strategy of
the United States as well as that of the Salvadoran
government and military.
G. PERIOD 5 (1986 - 1989)
The Salvadoran government's inefficient and corrupt
management of pacification programs influenced the
military's desire to increase its own role in pacification.
After the failure of 'Operation Well-Being' the focus of the
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National Plan changed. Instead of extensive government-
sponsored reconstruction and development projects, they
relied on only temporary, short-term civic action programs
directed by the SAF. The SAF became the leading actor in
pacification programs. Non-military efforts became
increasingly coordinated with military efforts, frequently
managed by military members. The US Agency for
International Development (AID) began to work closely with
the development of CONARA, the Combined Plan for Restoration
of Areas, which called for gradual wresting of areas from
guerrilla control through coordinated civilian and military
efforts.
In 1985 and 1986 the SAF gradually assumed more control
of 'the other war,' increasing their participation in
military civic action programs and PSYOPs. For the army
high command, military civic action came to be seen as a way
to increase its political and economic power. Due to the
perceived inability of the civilian government under Duarte
to coordinate the broad support effort required for
effective counterinsurgency, the SAF and the United States
created another phase of the National Plan in July 1986, a
program known as 'United to Reconstruct.' This gave the SAF
more control over pacification and nation-building, at the
expense of civilian government control and authority. The
1986 Plan outlined the goals and objectives for conduct of
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counterinsurgency for military campaigns and socioeconomic
development. It proposed three phases:
1) "cleaning up" operations;
2) area consolidation; and
3) reconstruction and development.
The military put itself in control of the plan, receiving
most of the funds from US AID.
The plan covered all 14 provinces, choosing target
areas within each. The plan placed high value on creating a
base of support for the SAF in the countryside, in reponse
to the FMLN's strategy of increasing the dispersion of their
forces and increased political organizing.
The pacification effort largely failed, due partly to
a) the army's inability to keep guerrilllas out of
the prigram areas;
b) the dispersion of resources because of the
large number of target areas;
c) FMLN economic sabotage; and
d) again, the lack of a credible attempt to form
civil defense patrols.
The plan was also inhibited by government and SAF
mismanagement and widespread corruption. Food and other
supplies were diverted by local military commanders and
government officials. Another drawback was the type of
development programs which the effort involved. The US
provided the Duarte government with aid for pacification
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programs, police and military training, and PSYOPs, but
little funding was available for actual economic development
programs, which could improve the poor majority. The
reforms were deceptive and mostly without much substance.
Due to an unemployment rate estimated at about 50% and
severe land scarcity as well as the sheer large number of
people displaced internally, most displaced people have had
problems finding a way to make a living. By 1986 an
estimated 25% of the Salvadoran population was displaced,
both within El Salvador and abroad. Neither US AID nor the
Salvadoran government have made much progress toward
implementing development, reintegration, and resettlement
projects. The programs for the displaced are mostly welfare
measures. The US government is the main source of food,
temporary jobs, and shelter materials doled out to initernal
refugees. The civic action programs consist of short-term
projects that combine handouts of food and clothing, dental
and medical help, and PSYOPs. Instead of helping to resolve
the conflict, most of the economic programs merely
contribute to the stalemate and increase Salvadoran
dependence on the United States. There is also incentive by
some elements within the El Salvador who are profiting from
the conflict to avoid i*s termination.
The FMLN focused on economic sabotage, a shift in
tactical operations as part of a new guerrilla strategy to
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try to exploit weaknesses in the government's base of
support, broaden guerrilla support among urban working
classes, and increase their political power through the
labor movement. 161
The FMLN's counter-strategy led to new security
problems for the SAF: they were no longer able to
concentrate forces in a few areas, but had to protect
military installations and economic infrastructure
throughout the country, in both urban and rural areas. The
SAF, experiencing low re-enlistment and high desertion
rates, as well as problems with its leadership and cohesion,
was unable tc'- deploy sufficient troops for security of the
pacified areas.162 Of the two main objectives of the
pacification programs, security and development, the SAE was
consistently unable to provide much security for
pacification projects, and did not sponsor any serious
economic development.
Unable to flush the guerrillas out rf the population,
the SAF began forcibly removing population from FMLN-held
areas, and bombing and shelling guerrilla-controlled zones
in Morazan and Chalat _:.ngo. Since the FMLN had no fixed





ineffective. The SAF increased the number of forced
evacuations. One estimate claims that FMLN-held territory
reduced from 30% in 1984 to about 10% in 1986.63 Another
analyst says that zones under guerrilla control were reduced
by a third by 1986 from their level in 1982.
Duarte rejected an 18-point plan offered by the
FMLN/FDR in May 1986. The FMLN had proposed that the
government forces refrain from using aerial and long-range
bombing and psychological warfare, and the guerrillas would
agre- to stop using antipersonnel mines, boobytraps,
kidnappings of local civil officials, and transportation
stoppages. In the proposal, both sides would have refrained
from conscription, and from targeting combatants' and
officials' relatives.
In June 1986, Duarte announced an initiative to hold
peace talks. A series of church-arranged preliminary talks
occurred in Mexico and Peru. Then the guerrillas refused to
meet with Duarte in Sesori, El Salvador, saying it was
pointless to meet because the government refused to accept
their requirement of a powersharing arrangement. The FMLN
did not trust the electoral process, whose rules were
written under the incumbent government, and did not feel
that the safety of their candidates running for office could
"":Garcia, 1986: 409.
17 -7
be guaranteed. In November 1986 the leaders of the FMLN
called for power-sharing in a transitional government.
Despite the armed forces' battlefield skills, by 1987
it had still failed to fully accept and adopt more
appropriate counterinsurgency tactics. The result was an
extended stalemate which neither side was able to break,
"...a seemingly interminable war of attrition."164 The
FMLN was reduced in strength, but had no inclination to give
up. In 1987 there were an estimated 10,000 militarily
active guerrillas an"I "about as many active supporters who
engage in sporadic acts of terrorism and sabotage... ''165
Duarte failed to reopen talks following a major FMLN
attack on March 31, 1987 against an army base in El Paraiso,
Chalentenango. The successful attack demonstrated that the
dispersal of the insurgents into smaller units had not
impaired their capacity to strike. This was followed by an
attack on another base, in Morazan, in May 1987.
In October 1987, Duarte met with guerrilla leaders in
San Salvador. Duarte claimed he would order a ceasefire,
but FMLN said they would not agree to Duarte's demands
because they would actually require an FMLN surrender. On
October 29, the FMLN announced a boycott of further talks




scheduled for the next day due to the assassination on 26
October of Herbert Ernesto Anaya, head of Salvadoran Human
Rights Commission.
In January 1988 dialogue was indefinitely suspended.
According to another estimate, at this time the FMLN was the
de facto local government in about 30% of the country. In
October 1988 Amnesty International cited a new wave of
killings by right-wing death squads. According to Americas
Watch, in the first six months of 1988, civilian deaths
attributed to the military increased 44% from the 1987
rate. 166 The FMLN conducted five successful "spectaculars"
in 1988 between February and December, against four military
barracks and a dam. US policymakers feared that if the
regime could not curb right-wing violence and show progress
toward a settlement, it could ruin bipartisan support for
the administration's Central American policy. The United
States was still providing $1.5 million a day in aid to El
Salvador.
In 1988 several top FDR leaders returned to El Salvador
to create the Democratic Convergence, an alliance of three
left-of-center parties. They did not participate in the
1988 legislative and municipal elections, but in July 1988
Villalobos declared that the guerrillas would not oppose
166Facts on File, 1988.
174
participation of the Democratic Convergence in the 1989
presidential elections, although the guerrilla war would
continue. FDR participation in the elections was an act
demonstrating at least semi-loyal opposition to the regime.
In a peace proposal drafted January 23, 1989, the FMLN
proposed support of the presidential election if it were
postponed six months and the government met a series of
other conditions, including reform of the judicial system,
reduction in size of the armed forces, and punishment of
past human rights violators.
By mid-1989 it was apparent that
... the rebels recognize that military action is
yielding diminishing political returns. Their actions
turned off the public, hurt the democratic left in the
election, and alienated potential supporters
abroad. 167
Representatives of both sides met in Mexico in February
1989 to discuss this proposal. A proposal by the FMLN on
February 21 offered to accept a "single army" if the
government agreed to reduce the size of the armed forces to
its prewar level of 12,000 from the present 60,000; dissolve
the National Guard, Treasury Police, and National Police,
and reorganize them into a single force under the control of
the Ministry of Interior rather than the armed forces; and
punish those responsible for massacres and political crimes.
167Lane: 26.
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They called for the creation of three joint commissions to
supervise "the mutual withdrawal of a military presence,"
the revision of El Salvador's electoral code, and the
process of international verification of political and
military agreements. They also proposed that if the
elections were postponed, the Legislative Assembly should
appoint a provisional president to take power between June
1, when Duarte was scheduled to leave office, and the time a
new president was elected. The proposal suggested that
elections be held after a ceasefire began (amending their
former proposal). The initial reaction of the military and
the government was negative. The armed forces issued a
statement describing the proposal as a "nefarious" strategic
plan that was part of the FMLN continuing effort to seize
power militarily.
When US Vice-President Quayle asked Salvadoran
government officials to reconsider the FMLN proposal, the
FMLN responded by offering to suspend military attacks
against American civilians and military personnel and
expressed hope for changes in US policy. The FMLN offered a
60-day ceasefire surrounding the elections if they were
postponed.
Over objections from the Democratic Convergence, the
FMLN sought to disrupt the March 1989 elections. The FMLN
reaction followed the breakdown of talks over the request by
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the FMLN to delay the elections so the FMLN could
participate. The electoral process also became the target
of FMLN actions, such as seizing and burning voting cards,
and coinciding national transportation stoppages with the
1988 elections. These practices cost the FMLN some of their
domestic and international legitimacy: "...Church leaders
now denounce guerrilla destruction as strenuously as they
denounce the sins of the extremists on the right... Both
extremes are viewed as wrong."""
In March 1989, the FMLN rejected a ceasefire declared
by the Army on 28 February, labeling it a publicity
maneuver. In mid-March, the FMLN cut off power and water
and shut down transportation in most of the country on the
eve of the March 19 presidential election. President
Alfredo Cristiani came to power with a landslide victory of
the far-right ARENA party in the March 1989 elections. In
April 1989, in response to a surge of repression against
opposition labor and human rights organizations following
the election of Cristiani, the FMLN attacked three military
facilities. In May they began heavy fighting in San
Salvador. In May 1989 the FMLN offered to end
assassinations and economic sabotage in return for the trial
of former Army Major d'Aubisson for the assassination of
'
68FBIS, July 6, 1988.
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Archbishop Romero.169 Hard-line military officers
dismissed the FMLN's offer as a ploy. In his inaugaral
address on June 1, 1989, Cristiani made a five-point
proposal for negotiations, but refused to discuss power-
sharing.
In a new proposal in fall 1989, the FMLN offered to
convert the organization into a legal political party and
run in elections in 1990 after a ceasefire. They also asked
that the army reduce its forces by 75% before they would put
their weapons down. But this time Cristiani did not dismiss
the offer out of hand. "No government in El Salvador can
afford to disappoint the country's longing for peace."' "17
The FMLN proposed a three-stage plan to the government
at a meeting in Mexico. They proposed that the FMLN would
agree to a ceasefire and participate in municipal and
legislative elections in 1990, in exchange for punishment of
human rights violators, sweeping reforms of the Salvadoran
army, and changes in the constitution, but made no promise
to disarm. The government agreed to meet again in Costa
Rica in mid-October, for a series of planned monthly
meetings. As the talks continued, the FMLN dropped their
169Since d'Aubisson is one of the founders of ARENA,




demands for powersharing. The discussions concluded on 15
September, and both sides agreed to continue talks in
October in Costa Rica. Two days later, Villalobos announced
that the FMLN would honor a ceasefire if the United States
would stop military aid to the Salvadoran government, and
asked that the government "end the reasons that have led to
taking up arms and maintaining the war," and listed the need
for sweeping political, military, and judicial reforms.
In mid-October 1989, President Cristiani proposed a
ceas-fire mt talks in Costa Rica. The government requested
the FMLN demobilize by January 1990 and offered virtually no
concessions, although Cristian suggested an "interparty
review of the electoral system" and unspecified measures to
"perfect the administration of justice.''7 FMLN leaders
rejected his proposal as "unrealistic and impractical." The
FMLN presented a proposal the following day for the
reorganization of the military, which the government
rejected. The FMLN opposed any ceasefire taking effect
before the government made substantial political and
judicial reforms and were provided credible guarantees for
their security. Both sides planned to send representatives
to Venezuela in November fo- further talks.
'
7
'Facts on File, 1989.
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On October 31, 1989 a bombing at the headquarters of a
leftist labor group resulted in deaths, which the FMLN
protested. In November 1989 Cristiani rejected a FMLN
ceasefire offer and pronounced the guerrilla offensive
'totally defeated.' Immediately afterwards new fighting
broke out, challenging that assertion. On November 10,
1989, the FMLN launched a major offensive in San Salvador
and other areas. In heavy fighting, the military
counterattacked. Despite the US belief that the FMLN was in
decline, government forces had difficulty coping with the
attack. The US administration claimed that the purpose of
the FMLN offensive was to provoke the death squads in order
to undermine US support for the government. In the
aftermath of the offensive, six Jesuit priests were
murdered, apparently by members of the military.
In December 1989, Congress threatened to withhold 30%
of the military assistance to pressure the Salvadoran
government to punish the killers and improve the human
rights record, but the proposal was defeated. Americas Watch
accused the US government of covering up human rights abuses
committed by the SAF. They claimed that the Bush
administration had played down and distorted human rights
abuses to protect US aid to the Cristiani government.
In 1989 the Salvadoran conflict was at a crossroads at
which a settlement was more likely: a new administration in
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both El Salvador and the United States. The new political
dynamics could result in policy adjustments that would
affect the level and priorities of US assistance, and the
specific conditions under which the aid was extended and
administered. The Esquipulas II accords resulted in reduced
regional support to the FMLN. There were indications of
severe economic problems in the Soviet Union which would
likely result in its reduced support for the FMLN and, in
turn, diminished support from Cuba and Nicaragua. The FMLN
was becoming more and more flexible in its settlement
conditions. However, initially, the Bush administration
continued thc Reagan strategy in El Salvador. Under the
Cristiani regime, US policymakers emphasized ties with the
Salvadoran elite, trying to lay the groundwork for export-
led growth based on a wider variety of cash crops. The
Cristiani government reversed what gains there had been from
land reform.
During this period, domestic pressure in El Salvador
for an agreement was very high. However, in the United
States the El Salvador support effort had become much less
of an issue until the December 1989 offensive, and demands
for a settlement were not significant. Other international
pressure for a settlement was also much reduced. External
support to the two sides was apparently not balanced. US
aid continued at a high rate (see Table 5.1) and there were
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no indications of an actual or anticipated reduction in the
near future. While there are no exact figures we can assess
that the FMLN anticipated (and probably experienced)
significant reductions in their support during this period.
This differential in outside support is a likely partial
explanation in the discrepancy in the sincerity of each side
to negotiate, shown by the greater flexibility by the FMLN
in its negotiating conditions. The Salvadoran government
and military felt sufficiently confident of their external
support that they did not feel as strong of a need or desire
to make concessions. Actual reforms during this period were
low. The military situation of the period in general is
best described as a stalemate. The conflict was apparently
somewhat de-escalated during much of this period. However,
it is necessary to compare estimated casualty rates and the
number and intensity of offensives and spectaculars to
determine whether this was actually the case. Complete data
for this comparison were not available to the author.
The adjusted DV score of 0.182 (see Table 5.3) shows
some progress toward negotiations in this period. However,
despite considerable concessions in the FMLN demands for
conflict termination, an agreement was not reached. The
conditions which the FMLN could not concede on were those it
believed threatened its political identity and the survival
of its members and supporters. The Salvadoran government
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did not relax the conditions by which the insurgents felt
most threatened. Although several meetinjs between
representatives of the two sides took place during this
period, the Salvadoran government demonstrated almost no
bending of its agreement requirements. The military sensed
victory, underestimated the remaining strength and support
of the FMLN, and believed that future US support was
guaranteed. As long as the FMLN retained enough resourcee
to survive and maintain operations, it was unwilling to give
in to such stringent demands.
H. PERIOD 6 (1990-92)
Following the November 1989 FMLN offensive and the
killings of the Jesuit priests by rightist death
squads/militar,, the Bush administration began to place more
of an emphasis on a negotiated solution and supported
efforts to reach an agreement. The Bush administration
realized that if right-wing violence continued there would
be moie calls to restrict aid or tie it to a negotiation
process. 72 In a December 1989 summit with Gorbachev,
President Bush raised the issue of ending Soviet support to
the FMLN through third parties such as Cuba. The Bush
administration also turned to placing increased emphasis on
reducing human rights abuses by government and the right.
172US News and World Report, December 4, 1989: 33.
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Peace talks between the Salvadoran Government of
President Cristiani and the FMLN began in Caracas, Venezuela
on 16 May 1990. The talks have been shrouded in secrecy to
prevent them from being used for propaganda purposes. "The
negotiations are not expected to lead to a quick agreement
to end the civil war, which has claimed at least 70,000
lives and displaced more than one in ten Salvadorans., '1 3
But diplomats note that for the first time both sides appear
to be seriously seeking to negotiate an end to the decade-
old conflict. The participation of UN mediators, also a
first, helped to raise expectations. The Salvadoran
business elite did not trust Duarte to defend their
interests in dealings with the left; Cristiani is one of
their own and they likely allow him more leeway in
negotiations.
The two sides remain separated by a political and
ideological chasm. However, several domestic and
international events have pushed them into making or hinting
at concessions. Over the past year, the FMLN has accepted
elections as the legitimate path to power, acknowledged that
El Salvador is within the US sphere of influence, dropped
demands for integration into the army, and recognized the
legality of the 1983 Constitution and the government's
'
73Gruson, Lindsey, "Salvadoran Foes Open Venezuela
Negotiations," in The New York Times, May 17, 1990.
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legitimacy. The Cristiani government has not matched the
FMLN concessions, but has been making statements that are
increasingly conciliatory."' Cristiani indicated that he
would be willing to meet a longstanding FMLN demand to
reduce the military from 60,000 to around 18,000, although
both sides need to negotiate the wording of any agreement to
cut military manpower and the timing of the reductions.
Some senior military members have publicly acknowledged the
need to build some type of checks and balances into the
country's political system by splitting the National Police
and the Treasury Police from the army and making them
independent.
Turning to the conditions for successful termination
outlined in Table 3.1, we can see that several factors in
addition to those already stated favor a negotiated
settlement. The conflict has been going on for a decade and
war weariness is widespread. New leadership has come into
office in one of the primary factions, the Salvadoran
government, and in two significant external supporters, the
United States and Nicaragua. Another major external
supporter, the Soviet Union, is experiencing severe economic
difficulties and political strains, making its support of
the insurgents a low priority. The remaining significant
"'Gruson, Lindsey, The New York Times, May 17, 1990.
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supporter of the FMLN, Cuba, also has less capacity to
maintain support and is unable to pick up any slack. The US
Congress has indicated its intention to reduce support to
the Salvadoran government as well. The estimated
appropriations to El Salvador for 1990 and 1991 (in Table
5.1) reflect reduced US support. The return to higher
ratios of economic to military assistance also suggest a new
priority of the US counterinsurgency strategy.
The positions of bctL id a have been uiaermined by
events abroad. In a civil war funded to a large extent from
abroad, the international climate can be nearly as important
as government legitimacy. Perestroika has undermined
marxism, and reduced or even ended Soviet backing for
revolutionary movements. US perception of the East-West
aspects of the conflict has reduced, and that justification
for US support is also less credible now, suggesting a
further reduction in US assistance. There has been a
decrease in sympathy for violent revolution among most Latin
American nations, and the unsuccessful example of the
Sandinistas has also discouraged the revolutionary option.
After overthrowing the Somoza government, the
Sandinista revolution experienced several economic and
political problems as well as conflict with an insurgency
supported by the United States. The combined effects of
these problems influenced the Nicaraguans to vote the
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Sandinista regime out of office in February 1990. Because
they no longer control the highest political office and have
fewer economic resources, the Sandinistas are less able to
support the FMLN.
Castro's capacity to support the FMLN is also limited.
The FMLN is changing its methods to try to regain and build
domestic and international support. They have not abandoned
the conflict, but have shifted their emphasis to the
polit.!al Rrd d41ium.tic arena. Villalobos has promised to
respect political pluralism and US security interestL.
The 1990-92 period is still ongoing, but we can make
some speculations of the next 2 1/2 years given the events
from January-May 1990 and consider current trends. The
adjusted DV score of 1.4 for the January-May 1990 period
(see Table 5.3) shows considerable progress toward reaching
a negotiated settlement thus far.
Each side has become more sincere about actually
reaching a negotiated settlement, due to the above
constraints, war weariness, and the extended stalemate.
Frequent proposals and actual meetings have characterized
the past year. There has been increasing flexibility in the
proposals of both sides (although much more in the condtions
of the FMLN) indicating an agreement to work out a
compromise. Popular support for the FMLN has reduced, due
partly to war weariness as well as to some the methods the
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FMLN turned to in the 1986-1989 period. Some significant
government reforms have occurred, including a significant
reduction in human rights abuses and in the electoral and
political party systems. The abuses have been kept low,
however, mainly due to Salvadoran dependence on US aid along
with occasional US pressure to keep violations in check.
International pressure and support, in general, have
favored an agreement. With the reduced assistance to both
sides the conflict is apparently de-escalating, although if
an agreement is not reached in the near future it is still
unclear to what extent the conflict could and would re-
escalate. There have been no significant offensives by
either side since December. Casualty rates on both sides
have been lower in the period since January 1990. An
increasing faction of the military has begun to favor a
settlement, and many of the hardliners who would prefer
continuing to strive for a military victory can be
influenced by their dependence on US assistance to moderate
their objections if not to actually honor the settlement.
US military aid and the leverage it provides (when
used) have contributed to some changes in the army's
behavior: it no longer routinely commits massacres;
although political killings increased in 1988 and 1989, they
are way below those of the early 1980s. Corruption is +'ill
widespread. Most military officers can be expected to
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cooperate with the civilian government as long as such
behavior is necessary to ensure fulfilling their perceived
need tor assistance.
The ideology of much of the revolutionary agenda may
likely have been discredited by recent events in the Soviet
Union and the results of the Sandinista experiment, likely
contributing to de-ideologization of some of the objectives
earlier held by many members of the FMLN. De-valuation of
power political values held as objectives by both sides as
well as their external supporter can be favored by CBMs
built into the agreement and an international security
commission to guarantee safety to each side. Impartial and
experienced mediation by the UN and the settlement meetings
occurring on neutral territory further increase the chances
of successful negotiations. Other conditions which must be
included in the settlement proposal to increase the chances
of success include: an amnesty offered by the government;
provisions for fair elections (for which they already have a
good foundation) and possible provisions for power-sharing;
and an agreement on the disposition and organization of the
armed forces of each faction.
US options had been limited previously by El Salvador's
near-total reliance on US economic and military aid. In the
past, if deprived of US aid the Salvadoran government would
have been hard-pressed to sustain its resistance aaa4.,t th-
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insurgents' strength. However, the military has become
stronger and better trained, the legitimacy of the
government has increased, the amount of support to the FMLN,
both domestic and international, has apparently diminished
substantially, and the number of FMLN members has apparently
declined. US policymakers can now reduce their aid without
being concerned with an imminent overthrow of the government
and the installation of a perceived Soviet-aligned communist
regime.
Some significant political reforms have taken place in
El Salvador. Some "democratic roots" have taken hold,
evidenced by the successful completion of five rounds of
national elections, major improvements in human rights,
emergence of a competitive (although incomplete) party
system, and strong evidence from turnout rates and survey
research that the majority of Salvadorans applaud the
democratic character (if not the performance) of the
regime."' How to incorporate the extreme Left into the
political process remains one of the vexing issues for
achieving conflict termination. Through labor unions and
other forms of peaceful activism the FMLN-FDR could build
its base of legal political support. The FMLN has conceded
that elections may be a way for them to move back into the
17 5BarrV: 33.
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political system. ElectiCns are scheduled for 1991 and
1994: perhaps the government could develop a set of
security guarantees to convince the FMLN to lay aside its
arms and participate."6
ARENA is still tied to the traditional elite, although
it has been forced by dependence on US assistance to
moderate its position and methods. Sigificant problems
remain in the attempt to build an actual representative,
democratic system. Some of these problems cannot be
resolved until economic restructuring takes place.
An important consideration to assess the potential for
conflict termination over the next 2 1/2 years is that
significant economic reforms have not occurred. Given the
socio-economic situation, even if a settlement occurs,
unless it addresses one of the primary sources of
discontent, it is likely that in the not-too-distant future
political conflict will resurface at a significant level as
potential for renewed struggle exists. Economic conditions
are worse now than before the war began. Very little of US
economic assistance has been used to actually improve the
basic living conditions of the poor and landless. Most of
the assistance has been channeled to programs aimed at
stabilizing the government, to strengthen the business
176Lane: 27.
191
sector and try to increase opportunities for US trade and
investment. The superficial nature of the development
projects did not adequately address structural socioeconomic
problems, focusing on provision of short-term relief.
Because of its alliance with economic elites and its
distrust of anything it perceives as even remotely
resembling "communism," the SAF has been unwilling to back
reforms needed to implement substantive economic change.
If the Salvadoran military were to become dominated by
a faction which believed that the military could continue
the struggle for a victory without US support and thus
resisted reforms and concessions, this would seriously
reduce the potential for a negotiated settlement and for
long-term stability in El Salvador. Given the current level
of dependence of the Salvadoran military on US support this
appears unlikely. However, as US support continues to
decline, hardline factions may conclude that they have
little to lose by going their own way.
International events could have significant effects on
the potential for a settlement as well as for long-run
termination. For example, a change in Soviet policy
contrary to that of the present, or Cuban insistence on
providing assistance to the FMLN, although unlikely, could
affect the willingness of the FMLN to make concessions the
Salvadoran government is willing to agree to. Another
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country willing and able to support the FMLN could also
affect the potential for a settlement, but no significant
supplier appears to be waiting in the wings. A replacement
for the United States as a significant supporter of the
Salvadoran government, especially one that did not require
as stringent restrictions on the Salvadoran military, would
also likely have negative effects on long-run termination.
A change in US leadership could also have a similar effect,
but the new administration would continue to be restricted
by the same constraints mentioned in Chapter Two, including
Congressional restrictions and public opinion. The FMLN
would have to commit a serious mistake such as a significant
atrocity against Americans or somehow appear as a
significant threat to United States security to justify a




This study began by examining the problem of US support
for counter-insurgency efforts of other countries in which
the US becomes involved to a magnitude and duration way
beyond the initial intentions of policymakers and planners,
the costs of supporting the counterinsurgency effort
apparently exceeding the value of the potential outcome.
After over ten years and $4.4 billion, "...many in Congress
and the American public are wondering what the US has to
show for its investment in El Salvador."''177
The principal goals of the US counterinsurgency support
effort in El Salivador, according to policy statements by US
agencies, are peace and stability, economic development, and
a strong democracy in El Salvador, as well as increased
security for the United States through preventing a
potentially hostile regime with an incompatible ideology
from taking power and aligning witl. governments hostile to
United States interests.
This study assumes that because revolutionary
insurgency is fundamentally a political problem, successful
conflict termination of most revolutionary insurgencies at
17mUS News and World Report, December 4, 1989: 33.
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an advanced phase requires a negotiated political agreement
as well as the use of military force. Thus it is important
for policymakers to keep in mind the effects of US
counterinsurgency support on the potential for reaching a
negotiated settlement.
Counterinsurgency strategies relying on mostly military
means and even those combined st-ategies that emphasize
achieving a military victory are not compatible with US
culture, history and ideology, nor with its domestic and
international image and posi-ion. Historically, a long-
term, large-scale military effort is not fe zible for the
United States given its political, aconomic and ideological
constraints identified in Chapter Two as well as
Congressional restrictions resulting from a combination of
these pressures. As Chapter Four explains, a military
victory also does not have positive implications for
achieving most of what US policymakers claim to be their
goals in intervening in insurgencies. Many military methods
are apparently inefficient and counterproductive in trying
to counter an insurgency, especially if not combined with an
emphasis on the collection and rapid analysis and renorting
of appropriate inteliigence relating to insurgent movements.
In trying to achieve termination of revolutionary
insurgency it is Important to remember that the insurgents
are willing to sccrifice terrain and space in order to buy
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time. In this type of conflict, compared to most others,
the insurgei- faction is generally relying on the extended
length of the conflict to achieve its ob-ective of taking
over the government. However, if a certain level of
extt-rna? support to the host g vernment is guaranteed, as
long as the government shows real progress in its reforms as
well as in concessions for a settlement, then time can be to
the advantag of the government and to its external
supporter as well.
Limits on the level and scope of US support to the
Salvadoran government over tne last decade, imposed by
Congress, have been c:itical to the ability of the US
administration to sustain its support effort. Congressional
restrictions were placed on US counterinsurqency support to
El Salvador on the amount and types of assistance, and tha
number of US troops in-country. US advisors were banned
from participating ir combat, and US assistance was tied to
requirements to reduce the number of human rights abuses,
military massacres and indiscriminate bombing on civilians.
These restrictions have limiteH. US domestic and
Congressional opposition to the counterinsurgency effort and
allowed the administration to regain the consensus needea to
continue the mdiur-scale level of assistancef for a long
period (at least ten years).
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Given the moderate scale and scope (no direct
intervention with US troops) of the US support effort, the
administration encountered less resistance to its
counterinsurgency support and could be assured of being able
to maintain the assistance.
The Salvadoran case suggests that a medium-scale
counterinsurgency support effort over a long period (of at
least a decade) is feasible, as long as the constraints
described above are not violated blatantly or for an
extended time period. A sustained large number of civilian
noncombatant casualties and flagrant human rights abuses by
host government forces would likely violate these
constraints. The lower political and economic costs of a
small- or medium-scale US support effort allow policymakers
to demonstrate that they are willing and able to continue
countering the insurgency for a long period of time, thus
countering "the power of the small belligerent."
The cliche of guerrilla warfare is that time is on the
side of the guerrillas: the longer the war, the more
likely they are to succeed. This may not be true in El
Salvador. A war of attrition, in which the government
has the firm material support of the US, may work to
the disadvantage of the FMLN.178
As explained in Chapter Two, widespread revolutionary
insurgency is a complex problem and thus requires a complex
solution. As shown in Chapter Four, combined
l7e8Aderson: 11.
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counterinsurgency strategies involve using a combination of
the many means available. Ideally they involve the
coordinated, integrated use of force along with a mix of
other instruments, including political and economic policies
and reforms. Combined strategies should be tailored to the
specific conflict and guided by a common goal. Such
strategies are recommended under the assumption that while
an important objective of US involvement in the
counterinsurgency effort is defeat of the insurgents, the
best means of carrying this out includes a combination of
such tactics as psychological operations, political reforms,
and civic action programs that provide actual development.
Another requirement of a counterinsurgency strategy
with potential for termination which fulfills many of the
goals of the United States is a long-range time focus. The
conditions behind this type of insurgency take a long time
to build up. In turn, to resolve an insurgent conflict,
gradual solutions should be applied. Ideally, enough
military force is provided to keep the government from being
overthrown but not enough for it to achieve an actual
military victory against the insurgents. The other
components of a combined strategy, such as economic and
political reforms and military reorganization and training,
are then provided time to work to eventually result in the
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loss of support for the insurgents and the gain of strength
and legitimacy for the government.
The types of assistance that the United States has
given the Salvadoran government show that US policymakers
have used a combined counterinsurgency strategy throughout
the last decade in terms of the means provided. However,
within that combined strategy the emphases and goals of US
policymakers have differed several times in the ten years of
US counterinsurgency support. At some times the US strategy
contributed more to achieving a negotiated settlement than
during other periods. A lack of flexibility in settlement
conditions over time signals an unwillingness or insincerity
to negotiate. If policymakers lack such flexibility, an
apparently combined strategy may actually be more of a
strategy of military victory. For much of the Reagan
administration this was the case.
Enough aid has been provided for the Salvadoran
government to survive, but not enough unrestricted
assistance was available to allow government forces to
achieve a military victory by means preferred by much of the
Salvadoran military as well as the US administration.
Congressional restrictions and other US domestic constraints
inhibited the administration's ability to provide the
support needed to win a military victory. Ideally, the time
which US support purchased for the Salvadoran government
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would have been used to give the non-military components of
counter-insurgency support time to work toward achieving a
loss of support for the insurgents and increased strength
and legitimacy of the government.
Political development has taken place which favors a
negotiated settlement and long-run conflict termination.
However, the time provided by US aid was not well-used to
actually produce the necessary economic restructuring.
It is important to distinguish between US aid programs
intended to reform and develop El Salvador's economy to
defuse revolutionary pressures, and those programs simply
intended to maintain the status quo.
Most US economic aid to El Salvador has been in the
form of Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance %see section
two of Chapter Five for a description of ESF). This has
contributed much more to stabilizing the economy and the
government than to actual restructuring and development.
This type of assistance has resulted in increasing the
desire of some Salvadorans to continue the war in order to
justify their continued assistance from the United States.
Such economic assistance to El Salvador has also had the
effect of allowing the government, economic elites, and the
military to avoid reforms which could contribute to the
socioeconomic restructuring that much of the population
supports and the insurgents have demanded.
200
The long-term resolution of the Salvadoran conflict
hinges on three inter-related criteria. The Salvadoran
government must
1) have the judicial, military, and political
means to increase democratic legitimacy and
prevent a violent victory by rightist or
leftist extremists;
2) have a political formula to facilitate a
viable, legitimate reincorporation of all
parties in the political process; and
3) continue to receive sufficient assistance to
recover.
Because of the overwhelming position of the United
States in the region and the extreme dependence of the
Salvadoran government on US support, a negotiated settlement
to the Salvadoran conflict will not be successful unless the
US administration is induced to or decides to support a
political settlement.
For much of the past ten years, the United States has
not supported a negotiated settlement to end the Salvadoran
conflict. Tts continued military assistance also allowed
the government to not make concessions and reforms needed to
achieve such a settlement.
The changes in factors and strategies are exhibited in
Table 5.2. Their apparent effect on the dependent variable,
progress toward achieving a negotiated settlement during
each period, is shown in Table 5.3.
201
Referring to the changes shown in Table 5.2, the
influence of the comparative level of domestic popular
support for the Salvadoran government and the FMLN and the
domestic pressure within El Salvador for conflict
termination through a negotiated settlement are strong
forces for achieving an agreement. Government reforms and
changes in the level of human rights abuses are an important
factor influencing the comparative level of domestic support
for each faction.
As Chapter Three explained, the sincerity of both sides
to reach a settlement through negotiations, which by
necessity entails a degree of compromise on both sides, is
critical to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. The
ability of a government to offer these compromises, in a
country such as El Salvador with a history of military
dominance of politics, is constrained by the level of
support within the military for a settlement.
The factor most influencing the military's willingness
to sincerely approach negotiations, as Chapter Three
explained, is apparently its perceived potential of winning
a military victory and its perception of the gains to be
made from that victory versus what could be achieved through
negotiations. This factor is influenced most by the
military's recent record of military successes, and the
comparative amount of resources it expects to have to
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continue its f-ght. Thus, an actual/anticipated reduction
of resources and/or a poor military showing (unless the
military expects imminent successes due to such factors as
increasing support, numbers, and training, or imminent enemy
weakness) an. its projection of insurgent support are
critical in influencing the desire of the military to reach
a negotiated settlement.
The host government's rationale is similar, except that
a civilian government may be more willing than the military
to forego a military victory. The government may also feel
that it is profiting less from the ongoing conflict than are
some factions of the military. The government may also have
long-term stability in mind more than the military does, and
thus be more willing to opt for compromises which would
result in incorporating the insurgents politically versus
attempting extermination of the insurgents and their
supporters.
Factors affecting the desire of the insurgents to reach
a negotiated settlement and to make the compromises
necessary to achieve one are similar to those involved in
the military's rationale. One of the factors affecting most
strongly the insurgents' sincerity in approaching
negotiations is also their perceived potential of winning a
military victory and their perception of the gains to be
made from victory versus what could be achieved through
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negotiations. This factor is influenced heavily by its
recent record of military successes, and the comparative
amount of resources it expects to have to continue its
fight. Thus, an actual/anticipated reduction of resources
and/or a poor military showing (again, unless the insurgents
expect imminent successes due to such factors as increasing
support, numbers, and training, or imminent enemy weakness)
and its projection of support to the military and government
are critical in influencing the insurgents to reach a
negotiated settlement. Like the host government, the
insurgents will likely be more concerned than the military
with long-term post-termination stability through means
other than repression.
Economic difficulties in the external supporter and
domestic pressure within external supporters relating to
their support effort have significant effects on each side's
perception of the comparative level of future support. New
leadership in external supporters can also have significant
effects on the subsequent level of support and pressure on
each faction to reform and negotiate.
Mediation offers, while a necessary contribution to
reaching a settlement, are not sufficient. However, there
are some indications that some mediators are more effective
than others. For example, the United Nation's experience
and resources for peacemaking and peacekeeping (although
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predominantly involved with international, not internal
conflicts) likely are a significant contribution to the
negotiations currently taking place.
Given the amount of progress between Periods 5 and 6,
de-escalation of the conflict appears to contribute toward
reaching an agreement. However, due to its occurrence
simultaneously with so many other changes, the extent of its
contribution is difficult to gauge.
Much of the influences behind these changes have been
external to the two primary factions involved in the
Salvadoran conflict, the government and the FMLN. "If there
is a single cause for the rebel decision tQ move toward a
negotiated settlement, it lies in the changing international
context affecting both the government and the rebels. ',1 7 9
One of the most critical factors affecting the progress
toward a negotiated settlement of an advanced revolutionary
insurgency in a case where both factions are moderately to
heavily dependent upon external support is apparently the
supporter countries' strategies, including their willingness
and sincerity to reach an actual negotiated settlement.
Changes in an external supporter's dominant strategy can be
affected by the changes in the opponent's strategy as well




A comparison between Period 2 (1981-mid 1983) and
Period 3 (mid 1983-mid 1984) illustrates this point. Many
of the factors are the same or very similar during the two
periods. The major differences are in the US
counterinsurgency strategy; the amount of popular support
for the Salvadoran government; the amount of reforms
promised as well as those actually implemented by the
government; the new leadership of the Salvadoran government;
and the dominant strategy of the insurgents. The reforms
inFuenced many potential or actual FMLN supporters to be
more willing to support the government, and pressured the
FMLN to want an agreement as it perceived its support base
to be declining.
The promised and actual reforms were influenced heavily
by a changed US strategy in Period 3 which supported and
helped engineer the political changes contributing to the
reforms as well as the change in Salvadoran administration.
These changes also led to the increased popular support for
the new Salvadoran regime. The significantly higher
adjusted DV score for Period 3 than for Period 2 shows that
the new US strategy increased the potential for an agreement
at this time. However, if a settlement had occurred at that
time it would likely not have resulted in long-term
stabilization since many of the reforms had not actually
taken place, especially in economic restructuring.
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The identical DV score for Periods 3 and 4 suggest that
the US strategy in Period 4 acted as a discouraging effect
on reaching a settlement which offset the positive effects
of the increasing flexibility of the FMLN.
The counterinsurgency strategy of the United States and
the Salvadoran government influenced the FMLN's desire to
prefer a negotiated settlement due to the costs of
continuing the conflict. However, the US approach and its
assistance discouraged concessions and reforms. Because of
the actual strategy of the US administration of preferring a
military victory, it inhibited a settlement from occurring.
Another important comparison is that of Period 5 (1986-
89) with Period 6 (1990-92). The DV score for January-May
1990 and the changes in this period discussed in the last
section of Chapter Five suggest that a settlement is
imminent. In the past year several factors have changed
which favor a settlement more than any time in the past
decade. The major differences in the factors between these
two periods include: the counterinsurgency strategies of
the US and the Salvadoran government; increased flexibility
in the settlement conditions offered by the Salvadoran
government; the new leadership of both the Salvadoran and US
governments as well as of one of the significant supporters
of the FMLN, Nicaragua, and changes in the Soviet Union
which have also influenced its strategy in the Salvadoran
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strategy; and the apparent de-escalation of the conflict.
These changes can be traced to two primary roots: the
change in US counterinsurgency strategy including their
approach to negotiations, and the changes in the Soviet
Union which have influenced its changes toward supporting
revolutionary insurgency and limited the options of other
potential supporters. This conclusion suggests that in a
case of advanced revolutionary insurgency in which both
sides are significantly dependent on external support, and
the strategies of the external supporters, including their
attitudes toward achieving a negotiated settlement and
acceptance of the concessions such an agreement requires.
Significant changes in the external powers' dominant
strategies can also result from effects exogenous to the
each other's strategies and totally unrelated to the
conflict, as several exogenous events occurring in 1990 and
their effects on negotiation progress in El Salvador have
shown. This is one of the limitations of the methodology
used, as explained in the first section of Chapter Five. It
is difficult to determine to what extent the changes in the
factors and in the progress toward achieving negotiations
are due to the exogenous events versus the strategy changes.
In addition, the strategy changes themselves were likely
heavily influenced by the exogenous events, such as the many
changes occurring in the Soviet Union and its allies.
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The results of the Salvadoran case study suggest that
the conclusions likely apply to other cases of a
revolutionary insurgency at an advanced state in which the
United States becomes involved in a counterinsurgency
support effort. One of the critical determinants of whether
a negotiated settlement is reached i. the US
counterinsurgency strategy, including the dmount vf
oonsistent, sincere pressure the TJnited States applies to
the host government to carry out political and econiomic
relorm and reduce its human rights abuses, and tie US
attitude toward reaching a negctiated settlemert and
influencing the host government to make the concessions
necessary to reaci an agreement. One of the caveats is that
this conclusion can be generalized only for insurge-'
conflicts in which the host government and its military are
highl. dependent on the United States for suppoit. Another
important qualification is that the insurgents must also be
willing to negotiate and sincere in making concessions
themselves. The conclusions have limited relevance in the
case of an insurgency such as the Sendero Luminoso in Peru,
which is apparently not dependent on foreign sources for its
support, and is so fanatical in its ideology that it is
unwilling to negotiate or make any concessions. Such an
insurgent opponent must undergo substantial de-
ideologization and find its domestic base of support
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significantly eroded (and that of the goiernment
substantially enhanced) and its access to weapons
substantially limited to influence the insurgent factior to
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